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ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION AND THE MULTI-FACETED INTERNATIONAL 
DIMENSIONS OF EU LAW:  
UNPACKING THE EU’S 2009 CLIMATE AND ENERGY PACKAGE 
Kati Kulovesi, Elisa Morgera and Miquel Muñoz.1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The EU Climate and Energy Package (the Package) is a comprehensive set of legal acts aimed at 
responding to global and European climate change and energy challenges, and integrating climate 
change considerations into a range of sectors and policies. The technical complexity of the Package 
illustrates how the body of legal norms related to climate change is expanding rapidly and 
becoming so specialized that many are now referring to ‘climate law’ as an emergent legal 
discipline.2 Yet, the Package contains a number of elements that could have important implications 
for the future of the European Union (EU) and are of interest to general EU lawyers. It has been 
described as “a momentous development”3 whereby major and politically contentious pieces of 
climate and energy policy were adopted in less than a year. One of the main objectives of the 
Package is to steer the EU towards a fundamental transformation in the coming decades and 
profoundly change how the EU produces its energy and how its economy functions. The Package 
aims “to make the European economy a model for sustainable development in the 21st century” and 
“transform Europe into a low-carbon, high energy efficiency economy” in such a way that requires 
“major political, social and economic effort.”4 The Package also demonstrates that climate change 
has come to play a central role in European integration, and in internal and external EU policies.5 
From the EU internal point of view, the Package shifts the emphasis from the Member States to the 
European level in areas such as renewable energy, energy efficiency and energy-intensive industries 
included in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS).6 From the point of view of the EU external 
relations, the Package is closely related to the EU’s efforts to play a global leadership role in the 
battle against climate change. This desire is reflected in the EU multilateral and bilateral external 
relations and the stakes are high.7 Through its global climate change leadership the EU has arguably 
enhanced the EU’s legitimacy in the eyes of European citizens and third countries. 8 Yet setbacks, 
such as the lack of European political dominance at the United Nations (UN) Climate Change 
                                                
1 The authors wish to thank Kasey McCall Smith for her excellent editorial assistance, and Robert Utter for commenting 
on an earlier draft of this article. 
2 For an overview of the relevant developments, see Kulovesi, “Book Review: The International Climate Regime: A 
Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures by Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge; and Legal Aspects of 
Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms: Making Kyoto Work edited by David Freestone and Charlotte Streck”, 
XIX Finnish Yearbook of International Law (2008), 389-398. 
3 Jordan and Rayner, ”The evolution of climate policy in the European Union: an historical overview”, in Jordan et al. 
(Eds.), Climate Change Policy in the European Union. Confronting Dilemmas of Mitigation and Adaptation? (CUP, 
2010), pp. 52-80 at p. 76. 
4 Commission, “20 20 by 2020. Europe’s climate change opportunity,” (Communication) COM(2008)30 final, 
23.1.2008, pp. 2-3. 
5 Oberthür and Roche Kelly, ”EU leadership in international climate policy: Achievements and challenges,” (2008) The 
International Spectator, 35-50 at 42-43. 
6 von Homeyer, “The evolution of EU environmental governance” in Scott (Ed.), Environmental Protection: European 
Law and Governance (OUP, 2009), pp. 1-26, p. 26. 
7 Jordan, Huitema & Van Asselt, “Climate change policy in the European Union: An introduction,” in Jordan & al. 
(eds.), Climate Change Policy in the European Union. Confronting Dilemmas of Mitigation and Adaptation? (CUP, 
2010), pp. 1-26 at p. 7.  
8 It has been argued that after the failure of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2005, climate change 
emerged as an opportunity to enhance the EU’s legitimacy and as a window of opportunity to advance both internal and 
external EU policy. Oberthür and Roche Kelly, cited supra note 5, at 42-43. 
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Conference in Copenhagen in 2009, are quickly interpreted as a sign of the EU’s diminishing role in 
world affairs.9  Through the Package, however, the EU can be seen as exercising a “softer” strategy 
of leading by example that places the emphasis on domestic climate change policy as a precondition 
for the credibility and legitimacy of international leadership.10 At the same time, our analysis will 
show that the Package contains a number of elements whereby the EU attempts to influence 
international legal and policy developments through its internal legislation.  
 
While the Package is thus interesting and relevant for general EU lawyers, assessing its innovations 
and broader implications may be a challenging task. Not only is the Package closely linked to the 
EU’s position in the negotiations on a future international climate change regime under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)11 but it also embraces other 
intertwined international dimensions. These range from its relationship to World Trade 
Organization (WTO) law,12 to the EU’s negotiating position in other multilateral fora, such as under 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)13 and discussions on ‘green growth’ in the lead-up 
to the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), which will be held twenty 
years after the historical 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro 
and is therefore known as “Rio+20.”14 Against this background, this article analyzes the Package to 
assess the way in which the EU attempts to use its internal legislation to influence international 
processes, on the one hand; and, to assess the influence of international law on EU law, on the other 
hand. While the phenomenon of ‘globalizing’ EU law has not escaped the attention of political 
scientists15 and EU lawyers,16 we seek to draw attention to the complex interaction between the 
legal tools that are used to these ends: inwardly, legislative choices at the level of EU internal 
regulation; 17  and outwardly, reliance on EU law in various multilateral fora and bilateral 
agreements. 
 
                                                
9 Lehmann, “Fallout from Copenhagen: Has the EU lost its global relevance?”, YaleGlobalOnline, 5 Jan. 2010, 
<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/fallout-copenhagen-has-eu-lost-its-global-relevance>, accessed 21 Feb. 2011. 
Lehmann identifies the EU as the “major victim of Copenhagen” , arguing that the Conference was a “humiliation for 
the EU” and a sign of its declining influence. 
10 Oberthür, ”EU leadership on climate change: Living up to the challenges,” in European Commission, The European 
Union and World Sustainable Development: Visions of Leading Policy Makers & Academics (Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 2008) pp. 33-43 at p. 50. 
11 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 Mar. 1994) 
1771 UNTS 107 (UNFCCC). These links are illustrated in Oberthür and Pallemaerts (Eds.), The New Climate Policies 
of the European Union: Internal Legislation and Climate Diplomacy (VUB Press, 2010).  
12 Final Act of the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations (adopted 15 Apr. 1994, entered into force 1 Jan. 
1995) 1867 UNTS 14 (WTO Agreements). 
13 Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 5 Jun. 1992, entered into force 29 Dec. 1993) 1760 UNTS 79 (CBD). 
14 The UN General Assembly, at its sixty-fourth session, adopted Resolution 64/236 (2010), convening in 2012 a United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development at the highest possible level, including Heads of State and 
Government or other representatives, with a two-fold focus on the “green economy” in the context of sustainable 
development and poverty eradication; and on the institutional framework for sustainable development. 
15 Kelemen, “Globalizing European Union Environmental Policy”, Princeton Annual Workshop on European 
Integration, 1 May 2009, < http://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/Kelemen.doc> accessed 8 Nov. 2010. Kelemen 
mentions examples related to climate change, genetically modified organisms, trade and environment, as well as 
chemicals. 
16 de Witte, “International law as a tool for the European Union”, 5 EUConst (2009), 265–283. 
17 See also Vedder, “Diplomacy by Directive: an analysis of the international context of the emissions trading directive” 
(SSRN Working Paper, SSRN-id 1477371) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1477371> accessed 8 
Nov 2010. 
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THE EU CLIMATE AND ENERGY PACKAGE AT A GLANCE 
At the 2007 Spring European Council, EU Heads of State and Government decided to adopt an 
integrated approach to climate and energy policy in order to transform the EU into a low-emission 
and highly energy efficient economy.18 The European Council committed to the objectives of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% from 1990 levels, increasing the share of renewable 
energy from 8,5% to 20%,19 and improving energy efficiency by 20%, all to be achieved by the 
year 2020.20 At the same time, the European Council indicated that the EU would step up its 
emission reduction commitment to 30% from 1990 levels by 2020 in the context of a 
comprehensive international climate agreement.21  
In January 2008, the European Commission proposed a package of measures to implement the 
target known as ”20 20 by 2020.”22 This included legislative proposals to improve the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme,23 to share emission reduction efforts-between the Member States in 
sectors not covered by the Emissions Trading Scheme,24 to promote renewable energy25 and to 
create a legislative framework and incentives for carbon capture and storage (CCS) in geological 
formations.26 These measures form a coherent package commonly known as the EU Climate and 
Energy Package.  
Details of the Package were subject to intense negotiations and political bargaining especially 
during the French EU Presidency in the second half of 2008. On 11-12 December 2008, the 
Package was considered by the European Council, where an agreement was reached by the Heads 
of State and Government with some important modifications to the initial proposals.27 The 
European Parliament agreed to the Package on 17 December 2008, and the Council gave the 
Package the final seal by adopting the new acts on 6 April 2009.28 The Package entered into force in 
June 2009.  
The main elements of the Package were published in OJ L 140, 5.6.2009. They are:  
• Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently 
repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (hereinafter, Renewables Directive);29  
• Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading scheme of the Community (hereinafter, EU ETS Directive);30  
• Directive 2009/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
amending Directive 98/70/EC as regards the specification of petrol, diesel and gas-oil and 
introducing a mechanism to monitor and reduce greenhouse gas emissions and amending 
Council Directive 1999/32/EC as regards the specification of fuel used by inland waterway 
vessels and repealing Directive 93/12/EEC (hereinafter, Fuel Specification Directive);31  
• Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on 
the geological storage of carbon dioxide and amending Council Directive 85/337/EEC, 
European Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 
2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 (hereinafter, CCS Directive);32  
• Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009 setting emission performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the 
Community's integrated approach to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from light-duty 
vehicle (hereinafter, Passenger Car Regulation);33 and  
• Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
on the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the 
Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020 (hereinafter, 
Effort-sharing Decision).34 
 
                                                
18 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 8-9 March 2007, 7224/1/07, at pp. 10-12 and 19-18. 
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The ‘environmental integration principle,’ currently found in Article 11 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), will be used here as a lens to analyse the Package.35 In 
this regard, both the external and internal dimensions of environmental integration will be 
addressed. External environmental integration entails that the EU environmental objectives, 
principles and criteria, spelt out in very broad terms in Article 191 TFEU,36 are “applied” in other 
policy areas in the same way as they must be applied in the environmental policy: that is, that EU 
policy areas other than environmental protection must “pursue” the environmental objectives of the 
EU, “aim at” or “be based on” its environmental principles, and “take account of” its environmental 
criteria.37 Internal environmental integration, in turn, entails that EU environmental law itself is to 
be construed and interpreted broadly, taking into consideration all of the EU environmental 
objectives, principles and criteria,38 basically requiring a holistic approach to EU environmental 
law-making.39 
                                                                                                                                                            
19 A number of measures to achieve the 20% energy efficiency goal had been identified previously in Commission, 
Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the potential, (Communication) COM(2006)545 final, 19 Oct. 2006. 
20 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 8-9 March 2007, cited supra note 18, at p. 12. 
21 Ibid. 
22 These slogans are reflected in Commission, “20 20 by 2020,” cited supra note 4.  
23 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to 
improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system of the Community, COM(2008)16 final, 23 
Jan. 2008. 
24 Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the effort of Member States to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020, 
COM(2008)17 final, 23 Jan. 2008. 
25 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of the use of energy from 
renewable sources, COM(2008)19 final, 23 Jan. 2008. 
26 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the geological storage of carbon dioxide 
and amending Council Directives 85/337/EEC, 96/61/EC, Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 
2006/12/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006, COM(2008) 18 final, 23 Jan. 2008. 
27 Elements of the final compromise regarding the energy and climate change package as agreed by the European 
Council at its meeting on 11 and 12 December 2008, 17215/08. 
28 European Parliament, 17 December 2008 and Council of the European Union, 6 April 2009, 8434/09.  
29 [2009] OJ L 140/16. 
30 [2009] OJ L140/63. 
31 [2009] OJ L140/88. 
32 [2009] OJ L140/114. 
33 [2009] OJ L140/1. 
34 [2009] OJ L140/136. 
35 Art. 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2010] OJ C83/47 (TFEU) reads: “Environmental 
protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union policies and activities, 
in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.” While the substance has not been changed with the 
Lisbon Treaty, it has been argued that the environmental integration principle is “less ‘visible’ than before” as it “sits 
alongside other similar provisions, for example, as to consumer protection, employment, animal welfare and 
discrimination.” See, Lee, “The environmental implications of the Lisbon Treaty,” 10 Envnt. L. Rev. (2008) 131-138, at 
134. 
36 Art. 191(1)-(3) TFEU reads: “1. Union policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the following 
objectives: preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, protecting human health, prudent and 
rational utilisation of natural resources, [and] promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or 
worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change. 2. Union policy on the environment 
shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. 
It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that 
environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay. […]. 3. In preparing 
its policy on the environment, the Union shall take account of: available scientific and technical data, environmental 
conditions in the various regions of the Union, the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action, the economic 
and social development of the Union as a whole and the balanced development of its regions.” 
37 Dhondt, Integration of Environmental Protection into Other EC Policies (Europa Law Publishing, 2003), p. 84. 
38 Ibid., p. 179, on basis of Joined Cases C-175/98 and C-177/98, Criminal proceedings against Paolo Lirussi and 
Francesca Bizzaro, [1999] ECR I-6881; Joined Cases C-418/97 and C-419/97, ARCO Chemie Nederland Ltd v Minister 
van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer and Vereniging Dorpsbelang Hees, Stichting Werkgroep 
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For present purposes, external environmental integration will be used to assess the extent to which 
the Package has contributed to integrating climate change concerns into non-environmental EU 
policies, such as energy and industrial production.40 In that respect, the environmental integration 
principle should guide the enactment of EU secondary legislation: while not necessarily giving 
priority to the environmental protection objectives of the Treaty,41 the principle requires EU 
institutions to take them into account systematically in other policy areas.42 Internal environmental 
integration, in turn, will be used here to assess the extent to which the Package takes a holistic 
approach to environmental protection, ensuring that other sectoral environmental initiatives 
consider climate change implications, and at the same time, that broader environmental concerns 
are fully accounted for in devising and implementing climate change measures (in other words, that 
climate change response measures are environmentally sustainable). Internal environmental 
integration is gaining importance at the international level: the vast majority of multilateral 
environmental agreements have developed a climate change component;43 while the possible 
negative environmental impacts of some of the proposed responses to climate change are 
increasingly being identified and addressed, with a view to proactively ensuring their environmental 
sustainability.44  
 
Analyzing the Package from the point of view of environmental integration is critical in the light of 
the enormous complexity of climate change as an environmental, economic, social and security 
challenge: greenhouse gas emissions are produced by a multitude of actors, from private citizens to 
multinational corporations, through a wide range of activities. To avoid dangerous climate change, 
significant climate change mainstreaming will be necessary in the coming decades. The objective of 
                                                                                                                                                            
Weurt+ and Vereniging Stedelijk Leefmilieu Nijmegen v Directeur van de dienst Milieu en Water van de provincie 
Gelderland, [2000] ECR I-4475; and Case C-318/98 Criminal proceedings against Giancarlo Fornasar, Andrea 
Strizzolo, Giancarlo Toso, Lucio Mucchino, Enzo Peressutti and Sante Chiarcosso, [2000] ECR I-4785, where the 
Court held broad interpretations of EU waste legislation. 
39 For a more detailed discussion, see Morgera, “An introduction to EU environmental law (from the viewpoint of 
international law)”, Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper (SSRN 2010), 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1711372> accessed 8 Nov 2010. 
40 Jans and Vedder, European Environmental Law (Europa Law, 2008), p. 17. 
41 Art. 191(1) TFEU, cited supra note 36.  
42 The justiciability of the environmental integration principle against the EU Institutions is discussed by Jans and 
Vedder, cited supra note 40, pp. 20-21. They conclude that “only in very exceptional cases (i.e. manifest error of 
appraisal) a measures will be subject of annulment because certain environmental objectives have not been taken 
sufficiently into account” (on the basis of Case C-341/95, Gianni Bettati, [1998] ECR I-4355). 
43 See, for instance, the Resolution on Climate Change and Migratory Species (UN Doc UNEP/CMS/Resolution 8.13, 
2005) adopted by the parties to the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (adopted 23 
Jun. 1979, entered into force 1 Nov. 1983) 1651 UNTS 333; COP Resolution X.24, “Climate Change and Wetlands” 
(adopted 4 Nov. 2008) by the parties to the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as 
Waterfowl Habitat (adopted 2 Feb. 1971, entered into force 21 Dec. 1975) 996 UNTS 245; and World Heritage 
Committee Decision 29COM 7B.a (adopted 17 Jul. 2005) by the parties to the Convention Concerning the Protection of 
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (adopted 16 Nov. 1972, entered into force 17 Dec. 1975) 1037 UNTS 151. An 
analysis on linkages between climate change and MEAs can be found in a forthcoming special issue of the Global 
Environmental Politics, edited by Jinnah and Muñoz, on climate change bandwagoning. See “Climate Change 
Bandwagoning: The Impacts of Strategic Linkages on Regime Design, Maintenance, and Death” 11(3) Global 
Environmental Politics (forthcoming 2011). 
44 Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity have been increasingly addressing the environmental sustainability 
of response measures to climate change, such as ocean fertilization (for which they adopted a moratorium through COP 
Decision IX/16C, in 2008) and geo-engineering (for which a moratorium was adopted by the Conference of the Parties 
in Oct. 2010 – CBD COP decision X/33, para. 8(w)). See Morgera, “Far Away, So Close: A Legal Analysis of the 
Increasing Interactions between the Convention on Biological Diversity and Climate Change Law”, 2 Climate Law 
(forthcoming 2011). Generally on the biodiversity impacts of mitigation and adaptation measures, see Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, “Connecting Biodiversity and Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation: Report 
of the Second Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Biodiversity and Climate Change” (Technical Series, No. 41, 
Montreal 2009). 
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the Package to make “the European economy a model for sustainable development in the 21st 
century” and commit to an economic transformation towards a low-carbon future “requiring major 
political, social and economic effort,”45 begs the question: has the Package succeeded in integrating 
climate change considerations into a range of key sectors, while duly considering potential negative 
environmental implications of climate policies?  
 
To answer to this question, this article starts by sketching the history of EU’s climate policy and of 
the Package. Subsequent sections will discuss key elements of the Package, namely changes to the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), as well as the Effort-sharing Decision and Directives on 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and Renewables. Through the lens of environmental 
integration, the article will highlight the multifaceted international dimensions of the Package. 
Focusing on the interplay between internal and external environmental integration will also allow us 
to examine the interplay between internal regulation and the external relations of the EU. These 
observations pave the way for our conclusions on how the Package exemplifies the complex web of 
internal and external legal tools that the EU uses to pursue its climate change objectives while 
seeking environmental integration. 
1. THE ASCENT OF EU CLIMATE POLICY 
The problem of climate change (or ‘greenhouse effect’ as it was then called) was first recognised at 
the Community level in the late 1980s.46 Around the same time, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) was created in 1988, and the intergovernmental negotiation process 
resulting in the UNFCCC was launched in 1990.47 During the UNFCCC negotiations, the EU 
already attempted to play an international leadership role and push for stringent international 
commitments. 48 Some of today’s motivations for this aspiration remain the same as in the early 
1990s when Environment Commissioner Carlo Ripa di Meana believed that the EU’s climate 
change leadership would help deepen political integration within Europe and enhance the EU’s 
credibility overseas.49 To boost its leadership efforts, the EU adopted an internationally ambitious 
target to stabilise its greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2000.50 Just before the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, the Commission proposed a 
package of measures for the EU to achieve this stabilisation target, including: a framework 
Directive on energy efficiency and conservation (within the existing SAVE programme); a Decision 
to support the development of renewable energies (ALTENER); a Decision concerning a 
monitoring mechanism for carbon dioxide emissions; and a Directive to introduce a tax on the 
carbon/energy content of fuels.51 However, the carbon tax proposal proved too controversial for the 
                                                
45 Commission, “20 20 by 2020”, cited supra note 4. 
46 European Parliament, “Resolution on Measures to Counteract the Rising Concentration of Carbon Dioxide in the 
Atmosphere (the “Greenhouse” Effect)” [1986] OJ C255/272; Commission, Communication to the Council on the 
Greenhouse Effect and the Community - Commission Work Programme concerning the Evaluation of Policy Options to 
Deal with the Greenhouse Effect, (Communication) COM(88)656, 16 Nov. 1988; and Council, “Resolution of 21 Jun. 
1989 on the Greenhouse effect and the Community” [1989] OJ C183/4. For a more detailed overview, see Mehling, 
“Emissions trading and national allocation in the Member States: an Achilles heel of European climate policy?”, 5 
YEEL (2005), 113-156, at 119-120 and Jordan and Rayner, cited supra note 3. 
47 The negotiating process leading to the adoption of the UNFCCC was launched by UN General Assembly Resolution 
45/212, 21 Dec. 1990. The UNFCCC was agreed in 1992 and entered into force in 1994, cited supra note 11. 
48 Jordan and Rayner, cited supra note 3, pp. 56-57, and Oberthür and Roche Kelly, cited supra note 5, at 36. 
49 Jordan and Rayner, cited supra note 3, p. 56 
50 Ibid. 
51 Commission, Community Strategy to Limit Carbon Dioxide Emissions and to Improve Energy Efficiency, 
(Communication) COM(92)246 final, 1 June 1992; Proposal for a Council Directive to limit carbon dioxide emissions 
by  improving energy efficiency (SAVE programme), COM(92)182 final, 26 June 1992; Proposal for a Council 
Decisions for a monitoring mechanism of Community CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions, COM(92)226 final, 30 
June 1992; and Proposal for a Council Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy, 
COM(92) 226 final, 26 June 1992;  
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Member States and the Commission’s proposed package fell apart, leaving the EU to travel to Rio 
with no internal policies and measures to deliver its stabilisation target.52 After the adoption of 
Agenda 2153 and the UNFCCC in Rio, the EU included climate change as one of seven themes in 
the 1993 Fifth Environment Action Programme.54 The Renewable Energy Decision was also 
adopted in 1993 but with more modest targets and less funding that the Commission had originally 
hoped for.55 EU-level action on energy efficiency also proved controversial with Member States 
insisting on more subsidiarity, and ultimately, no quantitative targets were set and detailed 
requirements on cars, homes and businesses were taken out.56 
 
In light of the failure of the carbon tax proposal, it has been argued that “internal climate policy 
discussions within the EU would probably have remained dormant” had the EU not committed 
itself in Rio to hosting the first Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC in Berlin in March 
1995.57 Presiding over the Conference, Germany, which also held the Presidency of the Council, 
managed to convince the UNFCCC Parties to launch a new negotiating process leading to the 
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.58 To boost the Kyoto negotiations, the Environment 
Council agreed in June 1996 to seek “significant overall reductions” in emissions after 2000 and 
indicated, for the first time that “global average temperatures should not exceed 2 degrees above 
pre-industrial level.”59 The 2°C target remains the cornerstone of the EU climate policy and has 
recently been adopted internationally under the UNFCCC as a benchmark for dangerous climate 
change.60 However, information since 1996 shows, on the one hand, that staying below 2°C will be 
difficult (but not impossible or very costly)61 and that limiting global average temperature increase 
to 2°C from pre-industrial times is probably not enough to prevent dangerous climate change, on 
the other hand.62 
 
After the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU negotiated an internal agreement on how to 
distribute its collective Kyoto target of reducing emissions by 8% from 1990 levels in 2008-2012 
between the then 15 Member States.63 Steps were also taken to identify ways to implement the 
Kyoto target and set up the EU’s internal emissions trading scheme.64 In 2000, the Commission 
launched the European Climate Change Programme; in 2002, climate change was upgraded to one 
                                                
52 Jordan and Rayner, cited supra note 3, pp. 58-59. 
53 Agenda 21 – Global Programme of Action on Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/REV.1, vols. I – 
III, 3 – 14 Jun. 1992 (Agenda 21). 
54 Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, “Towards Sustainability” [1993] OJ 
C138/1, at 42. 
55 Jordan and Rayner, cited supra note 3, p.  60. 
56 Ibid., p. 60. 
57 Ibid., p. 61. For analysis of European climate policy before UNFCCC COP 1, see also Grubb, “European Climate 
Change Policy in a Global Context”, in Bergesen et al. (Eds.), Green Globe Yearbook of International Cooperation on 
Environment and Development (OUP, 1995), pp. 41-50. 
58 Jordan and Rayner, cited supra note 3, p. 62. 
59 Council (EU), Conclusions of the 1939th Environment Council Meeting, 25 and 26 June 1996, Brussels, 
PRES/96/188.  
60 UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.16, Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
under the Convention, advance unedited version, 
<http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf>, accessed 21 Feb. 2011, para. 4. The text 
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of four priority action areas in the Sixth Environment Action Programme;65 and in 2003, the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) was launched.66   
 
The EU has progressively elevated climate change as a priority in its overall agenda on sustainable 
development and international cooperation, building upon the UN-driven inclusion of climate 
change among key threats to global security.67 The high priority given to climate change is now 
reflected in the TFEU, which highlights climate change among the global environmental issues for 
which the EU is expected to play a critical role at the international level.68 Reading this provision 
together with the environmental integration requirement points to an obligation to mainstream 
climate change in all EU policy areas.69  
 
The importance of climate change is also reflected in key institutional developments, such as the 
increasing involvement of the European Council in climate change decision-making, thus 
confirming climate change as a high-level political issue for the EU Heads of State and 
Government.70 It remains unclear whether the securitization of climate change71 will also lead to an 
involvement in climate politics of the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy,72 although the European Parliament has already made such a recommendation.73 It 
should also be highlighted that within the Commission, a separate Directorate-General (DG) for 
climate change issues (DG-CLIMA) was created in early 2010, incorporating activities formerly in 
the DG Environment, DG External Relations and DG Enterprise and Industry. 74  From the 
perspective of internal environmental integration, the separation of climate change from other 
environmental issues would, at a first glance, seem to risk the development of holistic 
environmental policies. Lee, for instance, has highlighted concerns that “[p]icking one 
environmental problem (however serious) has to raise certain concerns about ongoing efforts to take 
a more holistic, integrated and sophisticated approach to environmental governance.”75 On the other 
hand, based on the principle of collegiality within the Commission, proposals from the new DG-
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CLIMA are now subject to formal scrutiny by DG Environment: DG Environment is now in a 
better position to raise concerns over the environmental implications of the EU’s climate policies in 
the form of an objection.76 Furthermore, the new developments can be interpreted more positively 
in terms of external environmental integration, as leading to a “new phase in environmental 
governance in the EU,” where climate change as a ‘high politics’ environmental issue will bear 
considerable potential for “mutual integration of climate change concerns with energy and security 
policy.”77 
 
As already mentioned above, the ascent of EU’s climate change policy legislation has been closely 
linked to the EU’s desire to play an international leadership role in the fight against climate change. 
In addition to advocating a stringent international response during the negotiations for the 
UNFCCC, the EU also advocated stronger emission reduction targets than other developed 
countries during the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol.78 The collective Kyoto target by the EU-15 
to reduce emissions by 8% from 1990 levels is also higher (but not necessarily more difficult to 
implement) than the targets assumed by other developed countries. A key step towards the EU’s 
global climate leadership was taken in May 2002 when the then European Community and its 
Member States ratified the Kyoto Protocol,79 a particularly significant move coming a year after the 
US announced that it would not be ratifying the Protocol.80, The EU subsequently sought to show 
its leadership by creating the ETS when the future of the Kyoto Protocol was still hanging in 
balance,81 and used its political clout to secure the Protocol’s entry into force.82  
 
The Climate and Energy Package can be seen as yet another attempt by the EU to ‘lead by example’ 
at a time when both the legal shape and details of future international climate change cooperation 
under the UNFCCC remain undecided. The adoption of the politically controversial Package in less 
than a year can in fact be understood against the EU’s desire for a comprehensive international 
agreement at the historic 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen where nearly 120 
Heads of State and Government participated. 83  It has been argued that the “momentous 
development” of adopting the Package was possible because all the relevant actors seemed to 
ultimately accept that “EU international credibility and prospects for a deal at Copenhagen 
depended on the package being adopted in its entirety.”84 The Copenhagen Conference failed to 
meet most expectations and, after a record-long and acrimonious debate, the Conference resulted 
only in a decision to “take note” of the Copenhagen Accord negotiated by a small group of world 
leaders and civil servants.85 In the aftermath of Copenhagen, the EU’s global climate leadership was 
                                                
76 On the procedures for collegiate decision-making within the Commission, see Chalmers et al., European Union Law 
(CUP, 2010), pp. 55-56. 
77 von Homeyer, cited supra note 6, p. 26. 
78 Oberthür and Roche Kelly, cited supra note 5, at 36. 
79 Council Decision 2002/358/EC concerning the approval, on behalf of the European Community, of the Kyoto 
Protocol to the UNFCCC and the joint fulfillment of commitments thereunder, [2002] OJ L130/1. 
80 On the US announcement and the Protocol’s birthing difficulties, see Kulovesi, “How to prevent babies from being 
thrown away with the bathwater: Perspectives on the international climate regime from Buenos Aires to the future” in 
Morgera and Francioni (Eds.), The Future of Environmental Law: International and European Perspectives (The 
Working Group on Environmental Law: Collected Reports 2004 – 2005), EUI Working Papers Law, Law No. 2006/01, 
22-27, at 23. <http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/4083/1/WPLAWNo.20061ELWG.pdf> accessed 21 Feb. 
2011. 
81 Ellerman, Convery and de Perthuis, Pricing Carbon. The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (CUP, 2010), 
pp. 28, 18-19.  
82 Kulovesi, cited supra note 80, 23-24.  
83 Commission, ”Towards a comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen” (Communication) COM(2009) 
39 final, 28 Jan. 2009.  
84 Jordan and Ryner, cited supra note 3, p. 76. 
85 On the Copenhagen outcome, see, for example, “Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference”, 12(459) 
The Earth Negotiations Bulletin (22 Dec. 2009); Rajamani, “The Making and Unmaking of the Copenhagen Accord”, 
59 ICLQ  (2010), 824-843; Bodansky, “The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: a post-mortem”, 104(2) AJIL 
 
(2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 829-891 
questioned as EU leaders found it impossible to convince other key players, such as the US and 
China, to agree on an ambitious climate agreement.86 However, the UNFCCC negotiating process 
continues and has subsequently delivered some more positive results.87  
 
For our analysis, the Copenhagen experience highlights that ‘soft’ global climate leadership, 
including leadership by example88 - of which the Package is a glaring example – is probably the best 
and most viable option for the EU. Unlike other international players, the EU has already in place 
the regulatory framework to implement key aspects of its climate policy beyond the Kyoto 
Protocol’s first commitment period, ending in December 2012. It is useful to note, however, that the 
EU’s unilateral emission reduction objective of 20% by 2020 underlying the Package can be 
criticised as not being ambitious enough to limit temperature increase to below 2°C.89 After the 
2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen failed to bring conclusive results, the EU has 
engaged in an internal debate on whether to increase its mid-term emission reduction target to 30%, 
which is backed, inter alia, by Germany, France and the UK.90 The higher target would be more 
compatible with the requirements of climate science but the EU has thus far made it conditional on 
the adoption of a comprehensive international climate treaty.91 In May 2010, the Commission issued 
a communication on possible new policies and measures that would need to be added to the 
Package to achieve the 30% target by 2020.92 As of February 2011, the issue remains controversial93 
and experts do not believe that the EU will reach a decision on the issue before the next round of 
UNFCCC negotiations in South Africa in late 2011 and before the Danish EU Presidency in 2012.94 
 
While showing leadership in the international climate change negotiations has been a prominent 
driver for the adoption of the Package, it was not the only one. The Package responds to multiple 
concerns within the EU, from energy security95 and long-term economic competitiveness, to trade 
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and development cooperation.96 The basic philosophy underlying the Package is that climate change 
objectives can be achieved while continuing to pursue economic prosperity and job-creation within 
the EU.97 The Package seeks “to put Europe on the road to the future” and ensure that by the year 
2050, Europe will look “very different” in terms of supplying its energy needs.98 According to the 
Commission, therefore, the transition to a low-carbon future can be achieved while continuing to 
pursue economic growth.99 The EU climate policy goals also significantly shaped the recent 
“Europe 2020 Strategy” for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.100 The EU target for a green 
economy reiterates the EU “20 20 by 2020” climate change target, and the concept of “resource-
efficient” Europe entails decoupling growth from the use of resources, shifting towards a low-
carbon economy, increasing the use of renewables, modernizing the transport sector and promoting 
energy efficiency.101 
 
Finally, climate change is also playing an increasingly visible role in the EU’s bilateral external 
relations with a view to supporting the EU’s role as leader at the multilateral level.102 In the wake of 
the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, for instance, the European Parliament adopted 
a resolution calling for mainstreaming climate change in the EU’s bilateral external relations.103 In 
the second revision of the Cotonou Agreement – the world’s largest economic and political 
framework for North-South cooperation, involving seventy-nine African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries – the EU and ACP countries recognize for the first time the global challenge of 
climate change as a major subject for their partnership, committing to raise the profile of climate 
change in their development cooperation, and to support ACP countries’ mitigation and adaptation 
efforts.104 The following sections will also highlight how the EU’s bilateral external efforts to build 
consensus on climate change issues are linked with the EU’s position at the multilateral level and 
certain elements of the Package. The Europe 2020 strategy further confirmed this trend, by 
expressing the intention to increase the EU’s outreach on the bilateral level with a view to building 
mutual understanding with third countries in the search of a global solution to climate change 
through the proposed use of “regulatory dialogues” with partner countries in order to promote 
equivalence, mutual recognition and convergence in green growth and climate change regulatory 
approaches and tools, and the use of “high-level strategic dialogues” on energy and climate.105 
2. UNPACKING THE PACKAGE 
Looking at the Package through the lens of the environmental integration principle, the very fact 
that the EU decided to adopt a ‘package’ of legislative measures that jointly address climate change 
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and energy points towards a comprehensive and highly integrated approach. In many respects the 
Package includes innovative legal measures that support not only climate change mainstreaming 
(external environmental integration), but also the environmental sustainability of proposed climate 
change measures (internal environmental integration). In addition, the Package seeks to ensure its 
own ‘normative integration’106 into the crowded realm of existing EU environmental legislation by 
explicitly clarifying linkages with other relevant EU legislation and building upon certain pre-
existing climate and energy initiatives, modifying some and implicitly ensuring the continuance of 
others.  
 
Before proceeding to analyse the Package, we will take a closer look at its key components.107 First, 
the Package contains a Directive extending and revising the EU ETS from 2013 onwards. The EU 
ETS is the flagship of the EU’s climate policy, capping greenhouse gas emissions from energy 
intensive industrial sectors and currently covering approximately 40% of the EU’s total greenhouse 
gas emissions. The EU ETS Directive is complemented by the Effort-sharing Decision, which 
introduces binding emission targets for each Member State for 2013-2020 in sectors not included 
under the ETS, including transport, buildings, agriculture and waste. The Package also comprises 
the CCS Directive, which regulates the controversial climate change mitigation technology of 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) in geological formations for the first time in the EU, and creates 
incentives for pilot activities. The Package also includes the Renewables Directive which, also for 
the first time, addresses jointly all forms of renewable energy. It aims to increase the share of 
renewable energy to 20% of the EU’s overall consumption and to 10% of transport petrol and diesel 
consumption by the year 2020. 108  The Renewables Directive also includes unprecedented 
sustainability criteria for biofuels, and is, in this respect, linked to the Fuel Specification Directive, 
which was amended as a part of the Package with a view to facilitating the more widespread 
blending of biofuels into petrol and diesel. 
 
Energy efficiency is the third pillar of the EU’s climate policy. The EU seeks to reduce its primary 
energy use by 20% by 2020 compared to the business-as-usual projections. It has been estimated 
that measures to improve energy efficiency will lead to significant and cost-effective greenhouse 
gas emission reductions by 2020, thereby directly contributing to the objectives of the Package.109 
The key element targeting energy efficiency in the Package is the Passenger Car Regulation, which 
aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from transport by setting the first legally-binding fleet 
standards for carbon dioxide emissions from new passenger cars. The Regulation requires car 
manufacturers to achieve average fleet emissions of 130 grams of carbon dioxide per kilometre in 
2015.110 Falling technically outside the Package, a number of other measures have been adopted to 
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enhance energy efficiency by 20% by 2020.111 In addition to these key elements, the Package also 
includes amended guidelines on state aid for environmental measures, which were adopted by the 
Commission in 2008.112 While this article does not address the guidelines, they are certainly 
important in facilitating Member State action and make an interesting case study for analysing 
environmental integration in EU competition law. Turning now to the environmental integration 
and international dimensions of the key elements of the Package, the EU ETS Directive will be 
addressed first.  
3. THE EU ETS 
The EU ETS is the world’s most important greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme.113 It is a cap-
and-trade scheme, covering more than 10,000 operators during the ongoing second trading period. 
By creating a price for greenhouse gas emissions in energy-intensive sectors, the EU ETS has 
attempted to integrate climate change considerations into the strategic thinking of the covered 
economic actors and create an incentive for them to start investing in low-carbon technologies.114 
Having internalized some climate change costs into sectors such as power generation, iron and 
steel, oil refineries, cement and other building materials, as well as pulp and paper, the ETS can also 
be seen as a critical tool for implementing the external dimension of the environmental integration 
principle.115 All this is in line with messages from the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report and the 
Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change that introducing a price for greenhouse gas 
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emissions is one of the most effective ways to mitigate climate change.116 The EU has also been 
hoping that the ETS would inspire other countries to establish similar trading schemes and that the 
carbon market would expand through interlinked emissions trading schemes, first within countries 
belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and later also 
including other major economies.117 This section begins with a brief overview of the ETS and the 
key reforms introduced by the Package. It then analyses the ETS in the international context, 
focusing on its relevance for the EU’s climate change leadership and its relationship with 
international law, including the UNFCCC and the WTO. 
A. Overview of the EU ETS 
The ETS marked an important shift in the EU’s attitude towards carbon trading. During the Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations in 1995-1997, the EU and developing countries were critical of market 
mechanisms and stressed the need for domestic emission reductions in developed countries. 118 
Carbon trading was advocated by the US and other developed countries in the negotiating coalition 
known as the Umbrella Group.119 As part of the final deal, carbon trading was included in the 
Protocol through three flexibility mechanisms: the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint 
Implementation (JI) and international emissions trading. 120  The key motivation was cost-
effectiveness: only developed countries (known as Annex I countries) are required to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. This is in line with the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, which is found in Article 3.1 of the 
UNFCCC and forms one of the cornerstones of the UN climate regime.121 Developed countries are 
also historically responsible for the remarkable increase in greenhouse gases concentrations since 
the industrial revolution. However, the cheapest mitigation opportunities can be found in 
developing countries and in countries with economies in transition to a market economy. The 
flexibility mechanisms thus make the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol more cost-effective: 
developed countries can purchase carbon credits to comply with their Kyoto targets. International 
emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol takes place between two countries exchanging a part of 
their emissions ‘quota’ (or Assigned Amount) under the Kyoto Protocol. JI and CDM are known as 
project-based mechanisms and they generate transferable carbon credits from climate-friendly 
projects. JI operates in developed countries with emission targets under the Kyoto Protocol, while 
the CDM focuses on projects implemented in developing countries. 
 
Following the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU weighed the pros and cons of emissions 
trading122 and in 2000, the Commission’s Green Paper implied that a Community-wide emissions 
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Financing for Developed Country Commitments? (Edward Elgar, 2008), pp. 4-8. 
119 Ibid. 
120 The flexibility mechanisms are based on Article 6 (JI), Article 12 (CDM) and Article 17 (emissions trading) of the 
Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 11 December 1997, 37 ILM 
(1998) 22 (entered into force 16 February 2005), Art. 2(3) (Kyoto Protocol). 
121  Article 3.1. of the UNFCC provides that “The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present 
and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, developed country Parties should take the lead in combatting 
climate change and the adverse effects thereof.” For discussion, see Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International 
Environmental Law (OUP, 2006). 
122 Commission, “Preparing for implementation of the Kyoto Protocol” (Communication) COM(1999)230 final, 19 
May 1999 and Commission, “Emissions trading within the European Community” (Green Paper) COM(2000)87 final, 
8 Mar. 2000. 
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trading scheme would be established.123 The ETS currently applies to the 27 EU Member States, 
Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. Operators covered by the ETS must hold a permit to engage in 
activities covered by the EU ETS Directive. A competent national authority issues the permit after 
it is satisfied that the operator is capable of monitoring and reporting its greenhouse gas 
emissions. 124  Each year, operators must surrender allowances (EU Allowances, EUAs) 
corresponding to their monitored and verified greenhouse gas emissions during the previous year. 
Operators whose emissions are below their quota may sell their excess allowances. In contrast, 
operators whose emissions exceed their quota must purchase allowances to cover their excess 
emissions. A failure to surrender allowances results in a penalty of €100 per EUA. Each Member 
State has a national registry, in other words, an electronic database where the creation, transfer and 
surrender of EUAs are registered. There have been some considerable security problems with the 
national registries and, for instance, spot trading in EUAs (i.e. for immediate delivery) was 
suspended in early 2011 as hackers managed to steal EUAs worth millions of Euros from certain 
national registries.125 The Package contains provisions for the future centralization of the ETS 
operations into a single European Union registry that will be operated by the Commission and 
replace the national registries currently operated by each Member State.126 The move towards a 
centralized system should make it easier to ensure that adequate security requirements are put in 
place for the ETS registry.  
 
The first trading period of the ETS ran from 2005 to 2007, as a “learning-by-doing” phase, with a 
focus on setting up the necessary institutions and procedures.127 The current second trading period, 
2008-2012, runs in parallel with the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol and plays an 
important role in ensuring that the EU and its Member States comply with their Kyoto target.128 The 
third trading period of the ETS - as amended through the Package - will take place between 2013 
and 2020. Against this background, the adoption of the revised EU ETS Directive was important in 
confirming that the ETS will continue beyond the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period 
regardless of international climate policy developments. 129  This provided legal certainty for 
operators covered by the ETS and also sent an international signal on the EU’s aspiration to 
continue its international climate change leadership through the world’s largest greenhouse gas 
emissions trading scheme.   
 
                                                
123 Ellerman et al, cited supra note 81, p. 21. 
124 Permit conditions and procedures were coordinated with Directive 96/61/EC concerning Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control [1996] OJ L257/26. 
125 The ETS has also experienced other problems, including a widespread value-added tax (VAT) fraud scheme run by 
criminal networks in a number of Member States. See, “Further investigation into VAT fraud linked to the carbon 
emissions trading system”, Europol, 28. Dec 2010 
<http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=news&news=pr101228.htm>, accessed 21 Feb. 2011. A month before 
the hacking scandal, the Commission had issued a communication assessing current levels of protection of the carbon 
market from market misconduct or similar problems. See Commission, “Towards an enhanced market oversight 
framework for the EU Emissions Trading Scheme” (Communication) COM(2010)796 final, 21. Dec. 2010. 
126 Article 19.1 of Directive 2009/29/EC, cited supra note 30. 
127 Some of the key challenges during the first trading period included the identification of covered installations, 
organizing public consultations and lack of verified emissions data, which resulted in over-allocation of allowances. 
128 For the second trading period, emissions in the EU ETS sector have been capped at around 6.5 % below their levels 
in 2005. 
129 Some of the main questions for international climate policy include the continuity of the Kyoto Protocol beyond its 
first commitment period in 2012 and the ways of engaging the US and major emitting developing countries, such as 
China, in climate change mitigation efforts. For an overview, see Kulovesi and Gutíerrez, “Climate change negotiations 
update: Process and prospects for an agreed outcome in Copenhagen in December 2009”, 18 RECIEL (2009), 229-243. 
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In order to enhance its cost-effectiveness, the ETS is linked to the two project-based flexibility 
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM and JI.130 This means that operators participating in 
the ETS may use credits from the CDM and JI to comply with their emissions allocations. The main 
motivation was to enable operators covered by the ETS to take advantage of the cost-efficient 
mitigation opportunities in developing countries and countries in transition to a market economy. 
From the point of view of internal environmental integration, the EU has introduced some stricter 
requirements to ensure the environmental integrity of CDM credits than those applied 
internationally under the Kyoto Protocol. Credits from sink (afforestation and reforestation) projects 
under the CDM are not eligible under the ETS, and there are also limits concerning credits from 
large-scale hydro projects. In a significant move, the EU has recently decided to ban also credits 
from projects that involve the destruction of industrial gases, namely trifluormethane (HFC-23) and 
nitrous oxide (N2O).131 These are powerful greenhouse gases and their destruction can produce 
large amounts of cheap carbon credits.132 This is reflected in the fact that credits from industrial-gas 
projects currently account for two thirds of all credits generated by the CDM, with most projects 
located in China and other advanced developing countries.133 A proposal to ban HFC-23 projects 
from the CDM is subject to stalled negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol – one of the key concerns 
is that the inclusion of HFC-23 projects under the CDM can create a perverse incentive to continue, 
or even increase, the production of substances that must be phased out under the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.134 There are also other environmental concerns 
associated with these projects and that they distort the geographical distribution of CDM projects 
towards advanced developing countries. However, credits from the industrial gas projects will no 
longer be eligible under the ETS from May 2013 onwards, i.e. they cannot be used for compliance 
during the third trading period regulated through the Package.135 Given the dominant role of the EU 
in the carbon market, the ban should have important implications for the demand for credits from 
industrial gas projects under the CDM. It can therefore be seen as an example of the EU exercising 
“strong” international climate change leadership in an area where it is in a position to do so, and 
attempting to ensure that the internal dimension of the environmental integration principle is taken 
into account in climate change mitigation efforts.  
 
In terms of external environmental integration, the Package extends the sectors covered by the EU 
ETS, notably adding the chemical industry as well as more activities under the previously included 
energy, metal, mineral and paper sectors.136 Of particular interest is the decision pre-dating the 
Package but closely related to its objectives to include in the ETS emissions from all flights taking 
off and landing in the EU from 2012 onwards.137 Like the EU decision to ban CDM credits from 
industrial gas projects, also this decision can be understood in the context of a long-standing 
                                                
130 Given the uncertain fate of the Kyoto Protocol in 2003 at the time that Directive 2003/87/EC (cited supra note 66) 
was adopted, the link between the ETS and the Kyoto Mechanisms was done through a separate Directive 2004/101/EC 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC (“Linking Directive”) [2004] OJ L338/18.  
131 Emissions trading: Commission welcomes vote to ban certain industrial gas credits, (Europa Rapid Press Release) 
IP/11/56, 21 Jan. 2011. The European Parliament will subsequently have three months to comment on the proposal. 
132 HFC credits have been qualified as a “loophole” and “market distortion” to the CDM and carbon markets. See, 
“Kyoto Protocol ‘loophole’ has cost $6 billion” Newscientist (9 Feb. 2007) 
<http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11155-kyoto-protocol-loophole-has-cost-6-billion.html> accessed 11 Nov. 
2010 and Wara, “Is the global carbon market working?” 445 Nature (2007), 595-596. 
133 UNFCCC Secretariat, CDM statistics, < http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/>, accessed 21 Feb. 2011. 
134 The reason for such concerns is that HFC-23 is produced as a by-product of chlorodifluoromethane (HCFC-22) 
production, which is a gas that depletes the ozone layer and is also a powerful greenhouse gas. 
135 Note, however, that after industry lobbying, the ban will enter into force four months later than the Commission’s 
original proposal, “EU waters down ban on industrial gas offsets”, Carbon Market Europe, 21 Jan. 2011.   
136 For a detailed listing, see Annex I of Directive 2009/29/EC, cited supra note 30. 
137 Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community, [2009] OJ L8/3. 
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international impasse on whether and under which international forum (UNFCCC or the relevant 
sectoral organizations, International Civil Aviation Organization and International Maritime 
Organization) to take action on emissions from international aviation and maritime transport. For 
the purposes of our analysis, the EU unilateral action on aviation emissions illustrates how the 
environmental integration principle links with the international relevance of the ETS: the EU is 
attempting to integrate climate change considerations into the aviation sector whose rapidly 
growing emissions could offset the impact of mitigation in other sectors.138 At the same time, the 
EU is seeking to influence international behaviour in the aviation sector. However, the fact that the 
scheme will apply to non-European airlines has been subject to legal action by the Air Transport 
Association of the American some American airlines in the UK and a request for preliminary ruling 
on the issue is currently pending before the European Court of Justice.139  
 
B. The Package and Effectiveness of the ETS 
The EU ETS is often (but not universally) perceived as a success in that it has introduced a price for 
greenhouse gas emissions from energy intensive sectors in the EU, thereby sending a carbon price 
signal for business to start investing in low-carbon technologies and mainstreaming climate change 
considerations into their strategies.140 At the same time, the effectiveness of the ETS has been 
subject to a debate, which is obviously relevant in assessing the extent to which external 
environmental integration is actually supported by this legal tool.141 One of the key debates 
concerns the strictness of the emissions cap and the method of allocating EUAs to the participating 
installations. In theory, the two main choices for allocating allowances are so-called grandfathering 
(whereby allowances are distributed free of charge based on historical emissions) and auctioning 
(whereby participating installations are required to purchase the necessary allowances). During its 
first two phases, the ETS has mainly used grandfathering with the vast majority of EUAs allocated 
for free through National Allocation Plans (NAPs) drawn up by each Member State and notified to 
the Commission.142 Essentially, the Member State decided the overall amount of allowances and the 
criteria for allocating them during each of the first two trading periods, with the Commission having 
the power to reject a NAP or a part of it. As the effectiveness and desirability of this method was 
subject to debate,143 the method of allocating EUAs was one of the key reforms to the ETS brought 
about by the Package.  
                                                
138 There are links to multilateral negotiations under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), as explained 
in Vedder, cited supra note 17, at 7. The 37th Session of the Assembly of ICAO adopted a resolution to reduce the 
impact of aviation emissions on climate change. See, “ICAO Member States agree to historic agreement on aviation and 
climate change” (ICAO News release, PI0 14/10, 8 Oct. 2010) <http://www2.icao.int/en/Assembly37newsroom-
public/Documents/ICAO%20Member%20States%20Agree%20To%20Historic%20Agreement%20On%20Aviation%2
0And%20Climate%20Change.pdf> accessed 21 Feb. 2011. 
139 The Air Transport Association of America (ATA), American Airlines, Continental Airlines and United Airlines have 
challenged the inclusion of aviation emissions under the ETS in the UK High Court of Justice, which has requested a 
preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice. See [2010] OJ C260/9. See also Petersen, “The legality of the 
EU’s stand-alone approach to the climate impact of aviation: the express role given to the ICAO by the Kyoto 
Protocol”, 17 RECIEL (2008), 196-204. 
140 For an example of a largely positive evaluation, see Ellerman et al., cited supra note 81.  
141 For a recent critical assessment of the data concerning 2009 emissions, see Sandbag, “Rescuing the EU ETS from 
Redundancy” (Briefing Paper) <http://www.sandbag.org.uk/site_media/pdfs/reports/Rescuing_EU_ETS.pdf > accessed 
21 Feb. 2011. The paper argues that after five years, the ETS has “failed to constrain the annual supply of carbon across 
capped sectors for any year except 2008,” and given the significant drop in emissions in 2009 due to the recession, the 
second trading period of the ETS could “allow emissions to grow with no further need for domestic abatement until 
2017 or later.” 
142 Around 95% of allowances were allocated free of charge during the first phase and around 90% during the second 
phase. According to Art. 9 of Directive 2003/87/EC, cited supra note 66, the Commission may reject the NAP or any 
aspect thereof on the basis that it is incompatible with the criteria specified in the Directive. 
143 On both occasions, the NAP process was also slow to administer. The fact that the allocations for the first trading 
period were not based on verified emissions also gave rise to problems. While the aim was to set the cap close to 
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As a result of the Package, national emissions caps determined by the Member States will be 
replaced by an EU-wide emissions cap that decreases by a linear reduction factor of 1.74% each 
year from 2013 onwards beyond 2020.144 The introduction of the EU-wide cap and the provisions 
for calculating it offer “a long-term perspective and increased predictability, which is required for 
long-term investments in efficient abatement.”145 Overall, the new method for setting the cap and 
allocating EUAs through auctioning introduced by the Package can be expected to be more 
transparent, predictable and equal to the participating installations than the NAP process led by the 
Member States. According to the Commission’s original proposal in January 2008, auctioning was 
to become the norm for the power sector from 2013 onwards,146 but some limited exceptions were 
adopted as a last-minute compromise to ensure support for the Package by some of the new 
Member States.147 For industrial installations, auctioning will be gradually increased during Phase 
III, starting at 30% in 2013, and reaching 70% in 2020 and 100% in 2027.148 In those cases where 
allowances are not auctioned, they will be allocated based on harmonized rules using benchmarks 
related to greenhouse-gas performance.149  
 
While rules concerning the cap and allocation have been amended, the environmental effectiveness 
of the ETS in the third trading period is already being debated.150 Because of the global economic 
downturn, emissions in the sectors covered by the ETS have decreased more rapidly than expected 
– the most recent available data indicates that in 2009 verified emissions under the ETS were 11.6% 
below 2008 emissions and carbon prices fell correspondingly.151 The architecture of the ETS means 
that this drop in emissions will have consequences for several years even when the economy - and 
emissions - pick up: operators will be able to carry over 5-8% of their unused allowances the third 
trading period regulated by the amended EU ETS Directive.152  This has provoked criticism that the 
cap is too lax and that the ETS does not provide incentives for operators to make structural 
                                                                                                                                                            
business-as-usual emissions during Phase I of the ETS, the price of EUAs eventually collapsed from its high at around 
€30 close to zero as monitored data released in the spring of 2006 concerning the first year showed that that the cap was 
too lax and the actual emissions were lower than the allocations. Ellerman et al., cited supra note 81, pp. 36-42. 
Ellerman et al. explain that “The problem was that no Member State government had a good idea of the exact emissions 
within the ETS sectors,” at p. 37. During Phase II, the Commission took a stricter stance on the NAPs and verified 
emissions from 2005 were used as the baseline in setting the cap for 2008-2012, which is around 6.5% below 2005 
emissions. However, NAPs have been subject to a number of legal challenges. The most notable cases concern NAPs 
by Estonia and Poland for the second trading period where the General Court found that the Commission had exceed its 
powers when significantly reducing the allocations. See Case T-183/07 Poland v Commission and Case T-263/07 
Estonia v Commission, 23 September 2009. 
144 Art. 9 of Directive 2009/29/EC, cited supra note 30. The linear factor was determined based on the EU’s unilateral 
pledge to reduce emissions by 20% from 1990 levels by 2020 (i.e. by 14% from 2005 levels). The ETS sector will 
reduce emissions by 21% from 2005 levels by 2020, in other words, more than non-ETS sectors. The linear factor will 
continue beyond 2020 and it will be revised at the latest in 2025. 
145 COM(2008)16 final, cited supra note 23, at 7. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Preambular para. 19 and Art. 10(c) of Directive 2009/29/EC, cited supra note 30. 
148 Ibid., preambular para. 21. The Commission originally proposed to reach full auctioning in these sectors by 2020. 
149 Ibid., Art. 10a. See also Draft Decision by the Commission determining transnational Union-wide rules for 
harmonized free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC, as approved by 
Climate Change Committee, 15 Dec. 2010, at  
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/documentation/ets/docs/decision_benchmarking_15_dec_en.pdf>, accessed 21 Feb. 2011. 
150 Another issue that could compromise the effectiveness of the EU ETS is the use of international offsets. For 
example, in 2009, while credits from international offsets accounted for only 4.3% of credits surrendered under the 
ETS, the share of credits from controversial HFC projects accounted for 59% of all CDM credits under the ETS. 
Elsworth and Worthington, “International Offsets and the EU 2009. An update on the usage of compliance offsets in the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme” (Sandbag Climate Campaign Report, July 2009) 
<http://www.sandbag.org.uk/site_media/pdfs/reports/offset2009.pdf> accessed 11 Nov. 2010.  
151 “EU ETS: Emissions fall more than 11% in 2009” (Europa Rapid Press Release) IP/10/576, 18 May 2010. 
152 COM(2010)265 final, cited supra note 92, p. 3. 
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investments to reduce their emissions.153 In May 2010, the Commission acknowledged that the 
economic analysis underlying the Package was no longer valid and suggested “recalibrating” the 
ETS by setting aside EUAs originally intended for auction.154 It remains to be seen what course of 
action the Member States will choose to take in response to the Commission’s proposals. For 
present purposes, this seems to indicate that ensuring effective incorporation of climate change 
considerations into decision-making by the covered sectors (external environmental integration) can 
be a challenging task. In other words, during its first two trading periods, the ETS has struggled to 
set the emission cap at a level that would provide an effective price signal - first because of lack of 
reliable information on past emissions and then due to unforeseen impacts of the global economic 
downturn. This means that the effectiveness of the ETS during the third trading period is once again 
questionable and its practical implications for external environmental implication remain uncertain. 
C. International Dimensions of the Amended EU ETS  
Focusing on the multi-faceted international dimensions of the Package, the following sub-sections 
will address, in turn, provisions in the EU ETS Directive related to climate finance, carbon leakage, 
and expanding the carbon market by linking the EU ETS with other emissions trading schemes. 
i. Climate Finance 
One of the key issues in the negotiations under the UNFCCC relates to ways to finance climate 
change mitigation and adaptation actions, especially in developing countries.155 At the UN Climate 
Change Conferences in Copenhagen and Cancun, developed countries committed to a goal of 
mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries.156 
In addition, climate finance will also be needed for mitigation and adaptation in developed 
countries. The question of funding sources remains controversial and UNFCCC Parties have only 
agreed that funding for developing countries “may come from a wide variety of sources, public and 
private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources.”157 In light of the considerable 
future climate finance needs, provisions in the revised EU ETS Directive concerning proceeds from 
the auctioning of EUAs are interesting also from the international perspective. They are also closely 
linked to questions of external and internal environmental integration. 
 
In its proposal to amend the EU ETS and make auctioning the default method of allocation, the 
Commission suggested using a proportion of auctioning revenues: 
 
 … to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, to adapt to the impacts of climate change, to fund 
research and development for reducing emissions and adapting, to develop renewable 
energies to meet the EU’s commitment to using 20% renewable energies by 2020, for the 
capture and geological storage of greenhouse gases, to contribute to the Global Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund, for measures to avoid deforestation and facilitate 
                                                
153 Sandbag, “Briefing Paper”, cited supra note 141.  
154 According to the Commission, the unexpected drop in greenhouse gas emissions following the economic crisis 
means that the cost of complying with the 20% emission reduction target is now lower, estimated at €48 billion rather 
than the previously estimated “at least €70 billion.” COM(2010)265 final, cited supra note 92, p. 3. 
155 For the main outstanding points in the climate change negotiations, see, Kulovesi and Gutíerrez, cited supra note 
129; and Jinnah, Bushey, Muñoz and Kulovesi, “Tripping points: barriers and bargaining chips on the road to 
Copenhagen”, 4(3) Env. Research Letters (2009), <http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/4/3/034003/pdf/1748-
9326_4_3_034003.pdf> accessed 21 Feb. 2011.  
156 UNFCCC Decision 1/CP. 16, cited supra note 60, paragraph 98. 
157 Ibid., paragraph 99. Essentially, developing countries emphasise the need for new, additional and predictable public 
funding from developed countries, while developed countries wish to place the emphasis on private and innovative 
funding sources. 
(2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 829-891 
adaptation in developing countries, and for addressing social aspects such as possible 
increases in electricity prices in lower and middle incomes.158 
 
The Commission originally proposed that “at least 20%” of the revenues generated from the 
auctioning of allowances under the ETS should be used for activities related to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation.159 The final version retains the non-binding language and refers to “at 
least 50%” of the auctioning revenues or “the equivalent value of these revenues” (thereby leaving 
the Member States discretion to decide how to spend the auctioning revenues).160 Additions and 
specifications were also made to the list of possible activities, including references to the Kyoto 
Protocol Adaptation Fund, technology transfer, as well as afforestation and reforestation activities 
in developing countries.161 The chosen approach arguably reflects internal environmental integration 
to the extent that auctioning revenues generated under the ETS will be used to pursue a holistic 
approach to climate change mitigation and adaptation, by funding, inter alia, activities to avoid or 
mitigate adverse environmental impacts on biodiversity from CCS and deforestation, or to promote 
ecosystem-based adaptation.162 The idea of using climate financing for an integrated implementation 
of different multilateral environmental agreements has been put forward by the EU also in 
international fora: the EU has argued, for instance, that climate financing should be used to achieve 
both climate change and biodiversity objectives.163  
 
For the ongoing international debate on climate finance, the provisions on auctioning revenues in 
the revised EU ETS are noteworthy: while non-binding, they constitute the first example of 
legislation that aims to generate climate finance for both, domestic and international purposes.  It 
can be questioned, however, whether they are ambitious enough for the EU to assert global 
leadership in this area. Within the EU, the question of finance was subject to an internal debate 
throughout 2009. The lack of decisive position in the negotiations leading up to Copenhagen 
provoked criticism especially from civil society and the EU was accused of “putting a global 
climate deal at risk and threatening the lives of millions of the world’s poorest.”164 In the autumn 
2009, the Commission published a blueprint for climate finance, estimating that “finance 
requirements for adaptation and mitigation in developing countries could reach roughly €100 billion 
a year by 2020.”165 This would mean “international public funding in the range of €22 to 50 billion 
per year in 2020,” of which the EU’s share would be approximately between 10-30%.166 On 
meeting this funding requirement through auctioning revenues from the ETS, the Commission 
estimates: 
 
                                                
158 COM(2008)16 final, cited supra note 23. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Art. 10(3) of Directive 2009/29/EC, cited supra note 30. 
161 Ibid. 
162 On the interactions between climate and biodiversity law, see Morgera,  “Far away, so close”, cited supra note 44.  
163 Council (EU), “EU and global vision and targets and international ABS regime”, (Environment Council 
Conclusions, 7536/10, 16 Mar. 2010), para. 19, indicating that “public and private finance, including innovative forms 
of financing, and finance associated with the Copenhagen Accord on climate change, should - based on appropriate 
criteria - include scope for payments for ecosystem services, where appropriate, including for both adaptation and 
mitigation, and should specifically support conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity within REDD-plus, as 
appropriate, through the implementation of negotiated safeguards.” 
164 “EU climate approach puts world’s poorest people at peril” (Oxfam Press Release, 2 March 2009) 
<http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressrelease/2009-03-02/eu-climate-approach-puts-worlds-poorest-at-peril> 
accessed 21 Feb. 2011. 
165 Commission, “Stepping up international climate finance: A European blueprint for the Copenhagen deal” 
(Communication) COM(2009) 475/3, September 2009. The Commission further specified that domestic private and 
public finance could deliver between 20-40%, the carbon market up to around 40%, and international public finance 
could contribute to cover the remainder. 
166 Ibid. 
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Whilst it is difficult to be precise about the future carbon price and therefore the size of 
auctioning revenues, it is estimated that if the EU was required to finance €3 billion in 2013 
– the upper end of the scale – this would account for between 7 and 20% of total auction 
revenues. It would therefore be well covered by the revenues flowing into government 
treasuries from climate change policies.167 
 
Just before the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, in November 2009, the Council agreed to 
endorse these Commission’s financing estimates but without specifying the EU’s share.168 During 
the 2009 Copenhagen Conference, the EU pledged €7.2 billion of fast-start financing for a three-
year period in 2010-2012. 169  The EU has subsequently been criticised concerning the 
implementation of the fast-start funding pledge and questions have been raised, in particular, over 
whether funding by all Member States is new and additional.170 Overall, while the EU has attempted 
to play a constructive role concerning climate finance, divides persist between the EU and other 
developed countries on one side, and developing countries on the other, concerning the role of 
public financing in addressing climate change.171 In this regard, the non-binding provisions on 
auctioning review in the revised EU ETS Directive have not provided the final answer. 
ii. Carbon Leakage 
Another key international issue concerning the ETS in the Package relates to carbon leakage. 
Carbon leakage refers to a situation where mitigation policies lead to growth of greenhouse gas 
emissions in other sectors or countries as companies shift their production as a result of the carbon 
price. As explained above, the EU took a decision to launch the ETS and introduce a price for 
carbon dioxide emissions during one of ‘the darkest moments’ of international climate policy. This 
gave rise to concerns over competitiveness of the European industries: the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol are based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and developing 
countries, including China, India, Brazil, South Africa and other emerging economies have thus far 
not been required to control the growth of their greenhouse gas emissions.172 Furthermore, the US 
never ratified the Kyoto Protocol and does not intend to do so.173 This means that emitting 
greenhouse gases has, for the most part, no monetary cost outside the EU.174 Addressing concerns 
over competitiveness and introducing measures aimed at preventing carbon leakage formed 
therefore an important part of the Climate and Energy Package. According to the Commission: 
 
In the event that other developed countries and other major emitters of greenhouse gases do 
not participate in an international agreement that will achieve the objective of limiting 
                                                
167 Ibid.  
168 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 29-30 October 2009, 15265/1/09 Rev 1.  
169 This is in line with the (unadopted) Copenhagen Accord, which included agreement by developed countries to 
provide “new and additional resources, including forestry and investments through international institutions, 
approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010-2012.” For text of the Copenhagen Accord, see UNFCCC, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, annex to Decision 2/CP.15 (30 Mar. 2010). 
170 For criticism, see NGO Briefing Paper, The Preliminary Report on EU Fast Start Finance: NGO Comment and 
Analysis – Bare Bones, No Meat, 3 June 2010, < http://www.climnet.org/policywork/un-climate-negotiations/224-eu-
fast-start-finance-interim-reporting-has-little-meat.html>, accessed 21 Feb. 2011. 
171 “Summary of the Tianjin climate change talks,” 12(483) The Earth Negotiations Bulletin (12 Oct. 2010).  
172 However, in a significant move, all emerging economies have recently communicated their national mitigation 
pledges to the UNFCCC Secretariat in the context of the Copenhagen Accord. For information on the pledges, see 
UNFCCC Secretariat’s website < http://unfccc.int/home/items/5265.php> accessed 21 Feb. 2011. The Cancun 
Agreements included a process to “anchor” such pledges formally under the UNFCCC regime. See UNFCCC Decision 
1/CP.16, cited supra note 60, paragraphs 49-51 and 59. 
173 For a recent statement by the US under the UNFCCC that it “is not party to the Kyoto Protocol and does not intend 
to become such,” see 12(466) The Earth Negotiations Bulletin, (5 Jun. 2010).  
174 New Zealand already has a greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme. The US, Japan and Australia have all been 
planning to launch emissions trading schemes but their plans have run into political difficulties. Also China has been 
exploring options to launch emissions trading in certain energy-intensive industry sectors. 
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global temperature increase to 2°C, certain energy-intensive sectors and sub-sectors in the 
Community subject to international competition could be exposed to the risk of carbon 
leakage. This could undermine the environmental integrity and benefit of actions by the 
Community.175 
 
In 2009, the Commission determined sectors exposed to carbon leakage based on the criteria listed 
in the ETS Directive adopted as a part of the Package.176  
 
The key measure aimed to prevent carbon leakage included in the Package is that sectors exposed to 
carbon leakage will continue to receive 100% of their allowances free of charge. In its proposal, the 
Commission also mentioned the possibility of establishing “an effective carbon equalisation 
system” with the view of putting EU installations on a comparable footing with those from third 
countries. 177  The system would essentially mean requiring those importing energy-intensive 
products to the EU to purchase allowances corresponding to their greenhouse gas emissions during 
the manufacturing of the product. Final decision on the possible further measures to address carbon 
leakage was postponed pending the outcome of the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen 
in December 2009.178 The Directive requested the Commission to review the situation in light of the 
outcome of the international negotiations, prepare a report by June 2010 and make “appropriate 
proposals.”179 In May 2010, the Commission provided the required report, noting that given the 
uncertainties surrounding international climate policy, the measures already included in the Package 
to address carbon leakage - free allowances and access to international offsets - remain justified.180 
The Commission also discussed the idea of including imports into the ETS, noting that similar 
proposals had been discussed in the US and that “obviously it would be desirable for such 
initiatives to be taken together with such partners.”181 The Commission highlighted, however, 
concerns voiced by emerging economies over plans to include their imports under the ETS and 
drew attention to “broader issues about the EU’s trade policy and its overall interest in an open 
trade system.”182 Indeed, a number of questions have been raised concerning the compatibility of 
the proposed carbon equalisation system with WTO law and the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities under the UNFCCC.183 In its report, the Commission acknowledged 
that treating developed and developing countries in the same way in terms of climate change 
mitigation problems would be problematic from the point of view of the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities under the UNFCCC.184 The Commission also stressed the need to 
design measures targeting imports “carefully” in order to ensure their compatibility with WTO law. 
It also drew attention to potential administrative difficulties and argued that “it would seem 
challenging to verify the performance of individual installations in third countries without a highly 
sophisticated monitoring and reporting system in place at installation level.”185  
 
                                                
175 COM(2008)16 final, cited supra note 23.  
176 Commission Decision of 24 Dec. 2009 determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC, a list of sectors and 
subsectors which are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage, [2010] OJ L1/10.  
177 COM(2008)16 final, cited supra note 23. 
178  Preambular paragraph 26 and Art. 10(b) of Directive 2009/29/EC, cited supra note 30, indicating that the 
Commission should review the situation with respect to carbon leakage by 30 Jun. 2010.  
179 Ibid., Art.10(b).  
180 COM(2010) 265 final, cited supra note 92, at pp. 11-12. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid.  
183 For an overview of legal concerns, see Dhar and Das, “The European Union’s proposed carbon equalization system: 
Can it be WTO Compatible?” (Research and Information System for Developing Countries Discussion Paper No.156, 
25 Nov. 2009) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1513231> accessed 21 Feb. 2011. 
184 COM(2010) 265 final, cited supra note 92, at pp. 11-12. 
185 Ibid.  
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The provisions on carbon leakage and the proposed carbon equalisation system highlight the 
prominent international dimensions of the Package. While including imports under the ETS could 
boost the EU climate change objectives and show “strong” (but unilateral) climate change 
leadership, the Commission seems to be acutely aware of the fact that international legal challenges 
could well follow from such a decision.186 One of the international legal problems is that the most-
favoured nation principle, which forms the cornerstone of the WTO regime and requires equal 
treatment of imports from all WTO Member States, and the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, which forms the cornerstone of the UNFCCC regime, 
would seem to point to opposite directions. From the point of view of WTO law, a number of other 
considerations would also have to be taken into account.187 As an alternative to the carbon 
equalisation system, the Commission raises the possibility of “a more targeted approach to the 
nature and recognition of international credits in the ETS.” 188 The Commission mentions a possible 
pilot between the EU and China involving sectoral crediting on steel and highlights technology 
transfer as another means of helping emerging economies to close a competitive gap.189 Overall, a 
decision by the EU to include energy-intensive imports under the ETS would extend the carbon 
price signal to energy-intensive sectors outside the EU, thereby potentially promoting external 
environmental integration. However, from the point of view of international cooperation under the 
WTO and UNFCCC regimes, it would create controversy and thereby run counter to the EU’s 
general objective of promoting multilateralism.190   
 
Finally, the revised EU ETS Directive’s provisions on carbon leakage are also interesting from the 
point of view of legislative technique as they make a close and explicit connection between the 
outcome of international negotiations and possible changes in terms of EU’s internal integration. In 
other words, possible further action on carbon leakage in the EU is explicitly linked in the operative 
text of the Directive to the outcome of negotiations on the future climate regime under the 
UNFCCC.191  
iii. Linking Emission Trading Schemes 
The international dimensions of the ETS are not limited to climate finance and carbon leakage. As 
discussed above, the decision to adopt the ETS was linked to the EU’s desire to play a global 
leadership role in the battle against climate change and the ETS is seen “an important building 
block for the development of a global network of emission trading systems.”192 In this respect, the 
EU is hoping that the ETS will help to expand the global carbon market through interlinked 
emissions trading schemes, first within countries belonging to the OECD and later including other 
major economies.193 The EU’s desire to create a global carbon market is increasingly reflected also 
in the EU bilateral external relations.194 The Package introduced some reforms to facilitate the EU’s 
ambition to expand the global carbon market. In its original form, the ETS Directive allowed for 
                                                
186 Ibid., at 12. See also COM(2008)16 final, cited supra note 23, at 8.  
187 For a legal analysis, see Dhar and Das, cited supra note 183. 
188 COM(2010)265 final, cited supra note 92, p. 12 
189 Ibid. 
190 Art. 21(1) Treaty on the European Union [2010] OJ C83/1 reads: “The Union … shall promote multilateral solutions 
to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.” 
191 See, for example, Art. 28(1) of Directive 2009/29/EC, cited supra note 30, according to which, three months upon 
the approval of a future international climate change agreement leading to the EU undertaking mandatory emission 
reductions exceeding 20% from 1990 levels by 2020, the Commission must report and assess the agreement, focusing 
on elements specified in the Directive.  
192 “Questions and Answers on the revised EU Emissions Trading System” (Europa Rapid Press Release). 
Memo/08/796, 17 Dec. 2008.  
193 “EU Action Against Climate Change”, cited supra note 117. 
194 See, for instance, “EU-Republic of Korea Summit (Joint Press Statement), 6 Oct. 2010, where the leaders noted that 
the EU’s emissions trading scheme experience is a useful example in strengthening global carbon market mechanisms, 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/116900.pdf> accessed 21 Feb. 2011. 
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linking the ETS with schemes in other industrialised countries having ratified the Kyoto Protocol.195 
Due to the fact that the US will not ratify the Kyoto Protocol,196 new provisions were added to the 
ETS Directive, making it possible to recognise allowances from “compatible” and “mandatory” 
emissions trading schemes with absolute emission caps in “any other country” or “sub-federal or 
regional entities”197 The language would enable linking the ETS with either a federal or regional 
emissions trading scheme in the US. From the US domestic perspective, both alternatives remain 
open although a federal emissions trading scheme is looking far less likely as it did in 2009 and 
early 2010. Initially, the Obama Administration outlined plans for a federal cap-and-trade scheme: 
the Waxman-Markey Bill passed the House of Commons in 2009 and in May 2010, Senators Kerry 
Lieberman and Graham released the American Power Act for consideration in the Congress. 198 
However, plans for a federal cap-and-trade scheme have subsequently been frozen.199 The EU’s 
current focus thus remains on US regional emission trading initiatives, such as the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative and possible action by the Environmental Protection Agency.200  
 
From a global perspective, a link between the ETS and a comprehensive emissions trading scheme 
in the US would have important implications: not only would it be “a strong political signal for the 
creation of a global carbon market, but would eliminate competitive concerns between these two 
players caused by different carbon prices.”201 The scheme would also provide “the backbone for the 
overall international climate regime, with subsequent enlargements to other developed and 
developing countries.”202 Also other OECD countries, such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan 
are considering or have already launched national greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes. For 
this reason, the new provisions in the ETS Directive concerning links with other greenhouse gas 
emissions trading schemes represent a currently dormant but potentially important international 
dimension of the Package.  
4. THE EFFORT-SHARING DECISION 
 The EU ETS Directive is complemented by the Effort-sharing Decision,203 which is also significant 
both from an internal and external environmental integration perspective. Sectors not covered by 
the EU ETS represent approximately 60% of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions. In these sectors, 
the Effort-sharing Decision introduces a national target for each Member State during the period 
2013-2020. In average, the reduction in the sectors covered by the Effort Sharing Decision will be 
10% from 2005 levels by 2020 (see Figure 1). According to the Decision, the national target for 
each Member State was determined through a process seeking to reflect fairness, with targets set as 
a function of the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP): countries with high GDP per capita are 
required to reduce their emissions, while those with lower GDP per capita are allowed to increase 
                                                
195 Art. 25 of Directive 2003/87/EC, cited supra note 66, providing that “Agreements should be concluded with third 
countries listed in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol which have ratified the Protocol to provide for the mutual recognition 
of allowances between the Community scheme and other greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes in accordance with 
the rules set out in Art. 300 of the Treaty.” 
196 12(466) The Earth Negotiations Bulletin, cited supra note 173.  
197 Article 25.1(a) of Directive 2009/29/EC, cited supra note 30.  
198 Gerrad, “Climate regulation without congressional action”, New York Law Journal (New York 6 Oct. 2010) 244(68) 
<http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202472923986> accessed 21 Feb. 2011. 
199 Ibid.   
200 The RGGI is a regional emissions trading scheme for carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector in 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and 
Vermont. For an overview other regional initiatives see, Pew Center, Regional intiatives 
<http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/regional_initiatives.cfm>, accessed 21 Feb. 2011.  
201 Strek, Mehling and Turek, “Prospects of Linking EU and US Emission Trading Schemes: Comparing the Western 
Climate Initiative, the Waxman-Markey and Lieberman-Warner Proposals” (Climate Strategies, April 2009) 
<http://www.climatestrategies.org/component/reports/category/33/143.html> accessed 21 Feb. 2011.  
202 Ibid.  
203 Decision No. 406/2009/EC, cited supra note 34. 
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them.204 The targets adopted as a part of the Package were the same as those initially proposed by 
the Commission. Instead, what were modified during the political negotiations leading to the 
adoption of the Package were the rules applicable to meeting the targets.  
 
The Decision applies to sectors such as transport, heating in buildings and waste. Emissions in these 
sectors tend to be diffuse and have important differences in mitigation potentials, which is why 
Member States may use their discretion as to where to concentrate their efforts. It is useful to note 
that a sector known as Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) covering emissions 
and removals of greenhouse gases from direct human-induced activities affecting land use, is not 
included in the Package. The Commission was supposed to propose their inclusion once the 
international LULUCF rules have been agreed in the UN climate negotiations.205 In practice, the 
LULUCF sector is important as it accounted for some 8% of the EU’s total emissions in 2008.206 In 
September 2010, the Commission launched public consultations on whether LULUCF should be 
included in the EU’s 20%, or 30%, target.207  
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BE Belgium 2,2% 13% –15 % 70.954.356 92% 92,5% 
BG Bulgaria 9,4% 16% 20% 35.161.279 92%  
CZ Czech Republic 6,1% 13% 9% 68.739.717 92%  
DK Denmark 17,0% 30% –20 % 29.868.050 92% 79% 
DE Germany 5,8% 18% –14 % 438.917.769 92% 79% 
EE Estonia 18,0% 25% 11% 8.886.125 92%  
IE Ireland 3,1% 16% –20 % 37.916.451 92% 113% 
EL Greece 6,9% 18% –4 % 64.052.250 92% 125% 
ES Spain 8,7% 20% –10 % 219.018.864 92 115% 
FR France 10,3% 23% –14 % 354.448.112 92% 100% 
IT Italy 5,2% 17% –13 % 305.319.498 92% 93,5% 
                                                
204 Ibid., preambular para 8. See also COM(2008)17 final, cited supra note 24. 
205 Arts. 8.6 and 9 of Decision 406/2009/EC, cited supra note 34. The Decision contains provisions concerning the 
treatment of LULUCF emissions in the event that there is no international agreement by 31 Dec. 2010. At the UN 
Climate Change Conference in Cancun (December 2010), Kyoto Protocol Decision 2/CMP.6 contains agreement on 
LULUCF rules in the post-2012 period and an agenda for further negotiation. 
206 Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG Clima), Brussels, 10 Sept. 2010. Public consultation on the role of EU 
agriculture and forestry in achieving the EU’s climate change commitments. Background note for public consultation 
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/consultations/0003/background_climate.pdf> accessed 21 Feb. 2011. 
207 Ibid. 
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CY Cyprus 2,9% 13% –5 % 4.633.210 n/a  
LV Latvia 32,6% 40% 17% 9.386.920 92%  
LT Lithuania 15,0% 23% 15% 18.429.024 92%  
LU Luxembourg 0,9% 11% -20% 8.522.041 92% 72% 
HU Hungary 4,3% 13% 10% 58.024.562 94%  
MT Malta 0,0% 10% 5% 1.532.621 n/a  
NL Netherlands 2,4% 14% –16 % 107.302.767 92% 94% 
AT Austria 23,3% 34% –16 % 49.842.602 92% 87% 
PL Poland 7,2% 15% 14% 216.592.037 94%  
PT Portugal 20,5% 31% 1% 48.417.146 92% 127% 
RO Romania 17,8% 24% 19% 98.477.458 92%  
SI Slovenia 16,0% 25% 4% 12.135.860 92%  
SK Slovakia 6,7% 14% 13% 23.553.300 92%  
FI Finland 28,5% 38% –16 % 29.742.510 92% 100% 
SE Sweden 39,8% 49% –17 % 37.266.379 92% 104% 
UK United Kingdom 1,3% 15% –16 % 310.387.829 92% 87,5% 
 
* Share of energy from renewable sources in gross final consumption of energy, 2005, from 
Annex I, Directive 2009/28/EC. 
** Target for share of energy from renewable sources in gross final consumption of energy, 
2020, from Annex I, Directive 2009/28/EC. 
+ Relative to 2005. Member State limits in 2020 for greenhouse gas emissions from sources 
not covered under the ETS Directive compared to 2005 greenhouse gas emissions levels. 
From Annex COM(2008) 17 final. 
++ The EU ETS cap for 2013 has been determined at 1,926,876,368 allowances, and will 
annually decrease by 35.374.181. The 2012 cap, however, is subject to adjustments. 
§§ Relative to 1990, from Kyoto Protocol. 
§§§ Relative to 1990, from Council Decision 2002/358/EC, 25 April 2002. 
 
Under the Effort-sharing Decision, each Member State must meet its binding annual target.208 The 
target is subject to strict reporting and compliance checks.209 Member States that are in non-
compliance will be subject to coercive action.210 It is also possible for Member States to transfer 
                                                
208 Art. 3 of Decision No. 406/2009/EC, cited supra n. 34. Essentially, the targets include a linear emission reduction 
pathway. The starting point is based on average emissions in 2008-2010 and the end point is in 2020. According to Art. 
3.3, banking is possible and a Member State may carry forward from the following year a quantity of up to 5 % of its 
annual emission allocation.  
209 Ibid., Arts. 6 and 7.  
210 Ibid., Art. 7. 
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emission rights among themselves211 or to implement EU-wide projects.212 In this regard, the 
Effort-sharing decision has created new market mechanisms for emission trading between the EU 
Member States. 
 
Vedder has identified two international elements in the Effort-sharing Decision. First, as in the case 
of the EU ETS, there is explicit provision for adjustments depending on the evolution of the 
international climate regime. Second, Member States are called upon to ensure that purchase of 
credits enhance the equitable geographic distribution of CDM projects promoted by EU companies 
in developing countries and achievement of an international agreement on climate change.213 This 
international dimension relates to the possibility to use carbon credits generated by the CDM for 
which the Effort-sharing Decision contains detailed rules.214 This possibility also ties in with EU 
bilateral external efforts to support the CDM in third countries.215 Indeed, the preamble of the 
Effort-Sharing Decision provides that the Member State should be able to use additional credits 
resulting from agreements concluded between the EU and third countries. The interplay between 
EU domestic law and international action, at the multilateral and bilateral level, is also visible in the 
CCS Directive, which will be discussed next. 
 
5. CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE 
An unprecedented legal initiative included in the Package, the CCS Directive presents interesting 
international dimensions, particularly with reference to internal environmental integration. The 
latter point is clearly reflected in the purpose of the Directive, which is to establish a “legal 
framework for the environmentally safe geological storage of carbon dioxide to contribute to the 
fight against climate change” and to “eliminate as far as possible negative effects and any risk to the 
environment and human health.”216 The CCS Directive is considered the world’s first example of 
legislation dedicated to this issue.217 
 
According to the IPCC, carbon dioxide capture and storage is “a process consisting of the 
separation of carbon dioxide from industrial and energy-related sources, transport to a storage 
location and long-term isolation from the atmosphere.”218 The scope of the CCS Directive relates to 
the capture of carbon dioxide emitted during industrial processes and power generation, and storing 
the carbon dioxide in geological formations so that it cannot contribute to climate change. If 
                                                
211 Ibid., Art. 3.4, according to which a Member State may also transfer up to 5 % of its annual emission allocation to 
other Member States. 
212 Ibid., Art. 5.7, according to which Member States may use credits from EU-level projects issued pursuant to Art. 24a 
of Directive 2003/87/EC towards their emission reduction commitments, without any quantitative limit. 
213 Vedder, cited supra note 17, at 6, referring respectively to Arts. 5(1), 8 and 9 of the Effort-sharing Decision, cited 
supra n. 34. The Effort-sharing Decision limits the annual use of credits to 3% of the Member State’s greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2005, plus a possible additional share of its 3% annual quantity transferred by another Member State. Art. 
5 also contains rather complex criteria according to which certain Member States may use additional credits amounting 
to 1% of their 2005 emissions.  
214 Ibid., Art. 5. 
215 van der Grijp and Etty, “Incorporating Climate Change into EU Development Cooperation Policy,” in Gupta and van 
der Grijp, Mainstreaming Climate Change in Development Cooperation (CUP, 2010) pp. 169-205, at pp. 182-184.  
216 Art. 1 of Directive 2009/31/EC, cited supra note 32. Emphasis added.  
217 Roche Kelly, Oberthür and Pallemaerts, cited supra note 70, p. 19. There, is however, proposed CCS legislation in 
the US Senate. See “Rockefeller, Voinovich introduce carbon capture and storage development act of 2010” (14 Jul. 
2010) <http://rockefeller.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=326356> accessed 21 Feb. 2011. 
218 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Special Report on Carbon Capture and Storage, Summary for Policy 
Makers” (Report of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Montreal, 22-24 Sept. 
2005), < http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srccs/srccs_summaryforpolicymakers.pdf> accessed 11 Nov. 2010, at 
p. 3. The technical options for storage include geological (underground and under the seabed) and dissolved in the water 
column. This latest option is generally rejected due to to the large uncertainties regarding permanence and 
environmental impact. 
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successful, CCS would decouple carbon dioxide emissions from the use of fossil fuels, effectively 
decarbonising the energy sector. It has also been estimated that its mitigation potential is very large 
and the available storage space would be adequate to store about the double of the amount of carbon 
dioxide emissions that would be required this century, even under very ambitious climate policy 
assumptions.219 At the same time, the capture process requires large amounts of energy220 and it can 
also be questioned whether the use of CCS only entrenches unhealthy dependency on coal and 
fossil fuels.221 Furthermore, CCS is a non-demonstrated technology with several question marks 
surrounding it. As the CCS Directive preamble acknowledges:  
 
Each of the different components of CCS, namely capture, transport and storage of carbon 
dioxide, has been the object of pilot projects on a smaller scale than that required for their 
industrial application. These components still need to be integrated into a complete CCS 
process, technological costs need to be reduced and more and better scientific knowledge 
has to be gathered. 222 
 
In addition to being very costly, CCS demonstration projects face many hurdles, including 
technical, legal, safety and environmental considerations. The rationale for the EU legislative 
initiative on CCS relates to the recognition that global greenhouse gas emissions could not be 
reduced by 50% by 2050 (as required for the 2°C target) in a cost-efficient manner without CCS.223 
Nonetheless, CCS technology is associated with safety and environmental risks, including leakage, 
transport and sudden release of carbon dioxide, which in large quantities could be lethal. Like other 
large industrial installations, there are issues with storage sites, licensing, and public acceptance.224 
In addition, permanence is an important concern, in other words, whether it will be possible ensure 
that the carbon dioxide stored does not find its way back to the atmosphere. Because carbon dioxide 
is stored for the longer-range future, it also has long-term implications, including those of inter-
generational equity. 225 Others stem from legal and emissions liabilities in case of carbon release.226 
The Commission in fact identified in its impact assessment the risk that carbon dioxide captured 
and stored does not remain isolated from the atmosphere and biosphere, albeit concluding that 
impacts on terrestrial biodiversity would be very limited.227 For these reasons, Member States have 
discretion in determining whether to make available sites for storage and to identify such sites, as 
well as to determine the conditions for site use. 228   
 
                                                
219 Metz, cited supra note 61, pp. 138-141. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Mace, ”Carbon capture and storage: legal issues,” Sustainable Development Opinion (IIED, 2006), 
<http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/11066IIED.pdf>, accessed 21 Feb. 2011. 
222 Directive 2009/31/EC, cited supra note 32, at preambular para 11. 
223 Commission, “Summary impact assessment: Commission staff working document accompanying the proposal for a 
directive on the geological storage of carbon dioxide” SEC(2008) 55, COM(2008) 18 final, 23 Jan. 2008, para 10, 
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CCS, security of storage and unpredictable implications for the energy mix, see CCS proposal, cited supra note 19, at 3. 
225 Roggenkamp and Woerdman, “Looking beyond the legal uncertainties of CCS” in Roggenkamp and Woerdman 
(Eds.), Legal Design of Carbon Capture and Storage – Developments in the Netherlands, from an International and EU 
Perspective (Intersentia, 2009), pp. 347-360, pp. 347, 350. 
226 Chiavari, “The legal framework for carbon capture and storage in the EU (Directive 2009/31/EC)” in Oberthür and 
Pallemaerts (Eds.), cited supra note 11, pp. 151-177, p. 153. 
227 COM(2008) 18, cited supra note 223, paras 2 and 13. 
228 COM(2008)18 final, cited supra note 26, at 3 and 8. Art. 4(1) of the Directive 2009/31/EC, cited supra note 32, 
which reads as follows: “Member States shall retain the right to determine the areas from which storage sites may be 
selected pursuant to the requirements of this Directive. This includes the right of Member States not to allow for any 
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Besides creating an enabling legal framework for CCS, the Package also seeks to provide economic 
incentives and encourage the setting up of a network of demonstration plants across Europe. This is 
important given that CCS is very costly and has thus far been applied globally only in two large-
scale installations.229  These provisions also foreshadow the idea of extending the network also in 
key third countries,230 thus also embodying a bilateral external dimension. Of particular relevance is 
a provision of the ETS Directive to set aside up to 300 million EUAs supporting up to 12 CCS 
demonstration projects. 231  The precondition for the award of the free EUAs for the CCS 
demonstration projects is verified avoidance of carbon dioxide emissions.232 At current EUA prices 
in the € 15 range, 233 this constitutes a EU “subsidy” of about € 4.500 million, or € 375 million per 
demonstration project. In general, CCS facilities will be covered by the EU ETS from 2013 
onwards and, like the rest of the power sector, they will not receive EUAs for free.234 However, 
CCS facilities will not need to surrender EUAs for stored emissions, which provides a long-term 
economic incentive for this technology.235 In addition, the new guidelines on State Aid for 
environmental protection,236 combined with the existence of the CCS Directive, facilitate Member 
State support for demonstration projects. In particular, the guidelines state that “the means to 
support [CCS] (…) could constitute state aid but (…) it is too early to lay down guidelines relating 
to the authorisation of any such aid. (…) the Commission will have a generally positive attitude 
towards State aid for such projects.”237  
A. Environmental Integration Dimensions 
The CCS Directive focuses on geological storage of carbon dioxide,238 providing for the removal of 
unintended barriers in existing legislation (notably, on waste and water).239 It further explains its 
linkages with existing EU environmental law, clarifying that the Integrated Pollution Prevention 
and Control (IPPC) Directive240 applies to capture241 – given that it presents similar risks than 
chemical and power generation sectors242 – and the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
Directive243 applies to capture and transport, as well as to storage sites244 – given that it presents 
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similar risks to transport of natural gas.245 It is worth recalling that EIA outcomes will not 
necessarily result in specific permit conditions, as the obligation for authorities under the EIA 
Directive is to take the outcomes of the assessment into account,246 leaving them broad discretion in 
determining the substantive implications of the exercise. 247  Furthermore, liability for local 
environmental damage caused by CCS is regulated by the Environmental Liability Directive,248 and 
complemented by the inclusion of storage sites under ETS Directive.249  
 
In terms of internal environmental integration, the regulatory framework for CCS is premised on the 
selection of storage sites that aims to ensure the absence of significant risk of leakage and 
significant environmental or health risk.250 The selection is preceded by an assessment taking into 
account proximity of the proposed project site to valuable natural resources, such as protected areas 
included in the Natura 2000 network, potable groundwater and hydrocarbons.251 It also includes a 
risk assessment composed of exposure assessment252 and effects assessment,253 as well as other 
factors that could pose a hazard to human health or the environment.254 The central regulatory tool 
is the storage permit, which is subject to review by the Commission (leading to a non-binding 
opinion)255 and viewed as an exercise to enhance public confidence.256 Several environmental 
sustainability guarantees are then set out by the CCS Directive. The application to obtain the permit 
needs to include a description of measures to prevent ‘significant irregularities,’257 which are 
defined as any irregularity in the injection or storage operation implying a risk to the environment 
or human health.258 Permit conditions include observance of other relevant EU legislation.259  
 
Environmental safety is further guaranteed by the requirement to ensure that no waste or other 
matter may be added to the carbon dioxide stream, and that concentrations of incidental and added 
substances do not pose a significant risk to the environment or breach requirements of other 
applicable Union law.260 Monitoring to be carried out by the operator includes the surrounding 
environment for the purpose of, inter alia, detecting significant adverse effects, in particular to 
drinking water, human populations and users of surrounding biosphere. 261  Member States’ 
competent authorities are to check compliance with such monitoring obligations.262 
 
It should be also noted that provisions on public participation can serve to ensure internal 
environmental integration: in the case of the CCS Directive, a succinct provision on access to 
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information 263  may arguably facilitate the role of the public as watchdog for the overall 
environmental sustainability of CCS activities. The requirement for Member States to make 
publicly available environmental information related to the geological storage of carbon dioxide264 
is coupled with pre-existing public participation requirements under the EIA and IPPC Directives, 
in as far as these two instruments apply to CCS activities. It is, however, doubtful whether sufficient 
stakeholder involvement is provided for, given that under the EIA Directive there is no provision 
for consultation before environmental information is provided by the developer, so that there is no 
opportunity for public input when the necessity and scope of an environmental impact assessment is 
determined.265  
B. International dimensions 
There are important international dimensions linked to the legislative effort by the EU to ensure 
internal environmental integration with respect to CCS. CCS is being discussed in several 
international fora.266 In addition to the ongoing discussions under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol, the international regime on ocean dumping267 was amended to allow CCS in sub-seabed 
geological formations.268 In addition, the EU prohibits storage in the water column and beyond the 
areas under the jurisdiction of its Member States,269 taking on board the concerns raised within the 
Convention on Biological Diversity270 and by the decisions of the Parties to the OSPAR Convention 
to prohibit placement of carbon dioxide in the water column and on the seabed. 271 Both sets of 
international developments were explicitly quoted in the preamble of the CCS Directive.272 
 
One of the purposes of the CCS Directive is to bring a ‘pioneering” example of domestic legislation 
inspired by internal environmental integration to the multilateral environmental negotiations table, 
so as to provide a source of inspiration for the development of international law and of national 
law.273 Indeed, the recent EU submission to the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice stresses that industrialized countries can ‘take the lead’ in developing and 
deploying CCS, mentioning the CCS Directive as “a useful example for enabling CCS in other 
jurisdictions, respecting legal, cultural, social and administrative differences.”274 There the EU 
outlines various suggestions for the inclusion of CCS in the CDM, based on its own legal tools for 
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site-selection, monitoring, allocation of responsibility to one entity only, EIA, risk assessment, 
requirements for the composition of carbon dioxide streams, and liability.275 The EU also links its 
available support to developing countries in terms of bilateral external action, mentioning its 
readiness to provide capacity-building and engage in collaborative research and development, 
exchange of views on policy issues including legal frameworks, as well as opportunities for 
scientific collaboration between EU and non-EU researchers on CCS.276 This reflects the more 
generic reference to technology cooperation with key countries that was made in the CCS Directive 
preamble.277  
 
Proponents of CCS attempted, since 2005, to have the technology, or at least pilot projects, included 
under the CDM in order to secure the necessary financial political support to carry out CCS 
projects.278  These attempts were unsuccessful until late 2010, when the UN Climate Change 
Conference in Cancun reached agreement that projects involving CCS in geological formations are, 
in principle, eligible under the CDM.279 However, the decision is not yet operational but requires 
further negotiations to resolve Kyoto Protocol Parties’ outstanding concerns.280 Such concerns still 
include: non-permanence, including long-term permanence; measuring, reporting and verification; 
environmental impacts; project activity boundaries; international law; liability; the potential for 
perverse outcomes; safety; as well as insurance coverage and compensation for damages caused due 
to seepage or leakage. 281  
 
Some of the criticism to inclusion of CCS under the CDM has also been based on moral grounds, 
namely that developing countries should not be used as testing grounds for unproven technology. 
Pressure on the EU to legislate on CCS thus originated not only from the lack of progress under the 
UNFCCC and industries lobbying to allow the first demonstration projects and facilitate the long-
term commercialization of this technology, but also from the need to show global leadership and 
address moral concerns. Against this background, it is worth highlighting that the EU is also using 
its bilateral external relations with a view to test its legislation and promote CCS with partner 
countries, notably China. The 2005 EU-China Joint Declaration on Climate Change comprises 
time-bound goals for cooperation in developing and demonstrating CCS technology and reducing 
the cost of key energy technologies by 2020, as well as providing for regular follow-up at “suitably 
high-level…including in the context of Summits.” 282 
6. RENEWABLE ENERGY 
In addition to the CCS Directive, provisions emphasising internal environmental integration can be 
found in the Renewables Directive, which has three objectives: environmental sustainability, energy 
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security and technology innovation.283 In the context of the Package, the Renewables Directive 
seeks to increase the share of renewable energy to 20% of the EU’s primary energy consumption 
and to 10% of the energy used in the transport sector by 2020. This section will first introduce the 
legal scheme to support the achievement of the Member States’ national renewables targets, and 
then focus on the sustainability criteria for biofuels as a salient feature of the Package both in terms 
of internal environmental integration, as well as for its multifaceted international dimensions.  
 
Earlier EU energy law was fragmented, with EU legislation adopted on renewable electricity,284 
fuels, 285  and heat, 286  and conceived as distinct from climate change and environmental 
considerations.287 One of the important features of the Package is that it takes into account the 
integrated nature and inter-relationships between energy policy (comprising energy efficiency, 
energy security and renewables) and climate policy.288 Furthermore, the new Renewables Directive 
incorporates all forms of renewable energy under a single legal framework. The shift towards a 
more integrated approach is also reflected in the new legal basis for the EU energy policy 
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, where “regard for the need to preserve and improve the 
environment” is called for in all aspects of energy policy, namely: ensuring the functioning of the 
energy market; ensuring security of energy supply in the Union; promoting energy efficiency and 
energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and promoting the 
interconnection of energy networks.289 It should be noted, however, that the TFEU has not changed 
the unanimity rule required for adopting measures that affect Member States’ sources and structure 
of energy supply.290 
 
A. NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY TARGETS 
The legal framework supporting the achievement of the EU’s 2020 target for renewable energy 
comprises five elements: obligatory national targets for each Member State to achieve by 2020; 
national renewable energy action plans; flexible mechanisms allowing for cross-financing between 
Member States;291 administrative and regulatory reforms; as well as sustainability criteria for 
biofuels.292 For the first time, Member States are to coordinate their approaches to a range of 
planning, certification and educational issues associated with the renewable energy sector (on the 
basis of both obligatory provisions and recommendations), against a new single target, rather than 
separate targets for electricity and transport.293 The national targets contribute to a target of at least 
20% share of energy from renewable sources in the EU’s gross final energy consumption in 2020, 
which should be achieved also through energy efficiency and energy saving.294 The legally binding 
and differentiated national targets for each Member States (see Table 1) represent a notch up in 
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ambition from previously “indicative” targets,295 although the Commission only has weak powers 
concerning their implementation – it is tasked with evaluating the implementation of the national 
plans and making recommendations.296  The national action plans to be developed by Member 
States are to determine sectoral targets for the share of energy from renewables consumed in 
transport, electricity, heating and cooling in 2020 and the measures to be taken to achieve national 
overall targets.297 Thus far, it seems all Member States are on track to achieve their national targets 
– in fact, the latest assessment by the Commission indicates that renewable energy will increase 
faster than in the past and that the EU could even exceed the 20% target by 2020.298  
 
As mentioned above, the Renewables Directive introduced flexible mechanisms aimed at 
facilitating the achievement of the national targets. While most of the mechanisms focus on 
cooperation between the Member States, they also make it possible to count renewable electricity 
purchased from third countries against the national target of a Member State. Article 6 enables 
statistical transfers between Member States. This mechanism can be compared to emissions trading 
under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol whereby one country transfers part of its emissions quota to 
another country. Under Article 7 of the Renewables Directive, two or more Member States (also 
involving private actors) can also implement joint projects that relate to the production of energy 
from renewable electricity, heating or cooling. 299  This mechanism is similar to Joint 
Implementation under Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, which enables two countries with emission 
reduction targets to implement climate-friendly projects and agree on the transfer of the ensuing 
emission reductions. Article 11 of the Renewables Directive also makes it possible to create joint 
support schemes, whereby two or more Member States may decide to join or partly coordinate their 
national support schemes, and a certain amount of renewable energy produced in the territory of 
one participating Member State may count towards the national target of another Member State.300 
 
An international dimension to the Renewables Directive emerges from the third flexibility 
mechanism, which focuses on joint projects between EU Member States and third countries.301 
While this provision will be of limited practical relevance to meet the 2020 targets given that the 
EU is on track to meet or exceed its 20% target, Article 9 establishes a framework for third-country 
projects which may be important to meet targets beyond 2020, and represents a lifeline to projects 
such as DESERTEC,302 which is trying to deploy renewable electricity capacity in North Africa for 
European consumption. The mechanism established by Article 9 of the Renewables Directive 
resembles the CDM, which allows developed countries to benefit from carbon credits generated in 
developing countries. Importantly, joint projects between EU Member States and third countries 
allow third countries to access finance for renewables infrastructure.303  
 
It should further be noted that bilateral agreements between the EU and third States or regions may 
provide a readily available basis for supporting renewables in third countries: a standard clause in 
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most of the EU’s bilateral agreements calls for cooperation concerning renewable energy.304 This 
type of clause may allow the EU to support the implementation of key provisions of the 
Renewables Directive beyond its borders, with the consent of the third country/region involved, in 
the framework of established institutional structures for ongoing dialogue and cooperation.305 The 
international dimension of the Renewables Directive becomes even more evident when focusing 
attention on its unprecedented sustainability criteria for the production of biofuels, discussed next. 
B. BIOFUELS SUSTAINABILITY CRITERIA 
As explained above, the Renewables Directive aims to increase the share of renewable energy in the 
transport sector to 10% by 2020. This includes biofuels (in other words, fuels of renewable and 
biological origin, including woodfuel, charcoal, livestock manure, biogas, bio-hydrogen, bio-
alcohol, microbial biomass, agricultural wastes and byproducts, and energy crops), which have been 
in the international spotlight for several reasons and were subject to a fierce debate also within the 
EU during the negotiations for the Package.306 This is because concerns related to biofuels have 
been raised regarding food security, adverse environmental impacts and deforestation, additional 
pressure on dwindling land and water resources, potential negative effects on indigenous and local 
communities and small-holder farmers, as well as introduction and spread of genetically modified 
organisms or of invasive alien species.307 In addition, the debate continues on whether and to what 
extent the use of biofuels reduces greenhouse gas emissions if the whole lifecycle analysis is 
considered.308 In an effort to address these concerns, and to ensure that the 10% target for biofuels 
implemented by the Package avoids negative environmental impacts, particularly deforestation and 
loss of biodiversity, the EU introduced sustainability criteria for their production. These criteria 
were one of the most innovative features of the Package and they are also reflected in the Fuel 
Specification Directive, which includes, verbatim, all language from the Renewables Directive 
applicable to biofuels.309  
 
The decision of the EU to adopt pioneering sustainability criteria for biofuels should be placed in 
the broader context of ongoing negotiations in various multilateral fora on possible international 
standards in this respect. In the context of the CBD, entrenched positions have been presented as to 
whether international standards should be developed to ensure maximizing the positive and 
minimizing the negative impacts of biofuels on the environment, biodiversity and local and 
indigenous communities.310 The EU continues to support the development of international standards 
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under the CBD,311 highlighting the Renewables Directive and its own sustainability criteria as 
relevant examples in that respect. At the same, the sustainability criteria aim to affect biofuels 
production and land-use decisions in third countries importing biofuels to the EU, thereby bringing 
to the fore questions concerning the compatibility of the criteria with WTO law. The following 
subsection will thus in turn look into the environmental integration aspects of the criteria, as well as 
their international dimension both in terms of WTO law compatibility and of inclusion in the EU 
bilateral external action. 
i. Environmental Integration 
Like the CCS Directive, the argument can be made that the EU adopted legislation on biofuels with 
a view to showing leadership on a controversial international issue. From this perspective, the 
provisions in the Renewables Directive can be seen as an attempt to ensure internal environmental 
integration with a view to providing a good-practice example to other countries to inspire national 
action in partner countries or to influence ongoing international negotiations. The biofuels 
sustainability criteria purposely contain references to multilateral environmental agreements and 
related international processes. Specifically, the criteria concern land with high biodiversity value 
and land with high carbon stock also requiring greenhouse gas emission savings (of at least 35%312). 
While these two sets of criteria apply both to imported biofuels and to those produced within the 
EU, an additional criteria of cross-compliance applies only to the latter. Thus, for biofuels produced 
within the EU, the Renewables Directive requires compliance with existing requirements under EU 
environmental law for agriculture, including protection of groundwater and surface water quality 
and social requirements.313  
 
With regards to biodiversity concerns, the Directive adopted a three-tiered approach. First, it 
requires that biofuels and bioliquids must not be made from raw material obtained from land with 
high biodiversity value (according to the definition of primary forest used by the FAO in its Global 
Forest Resource Assessment;314) and protected areas, or highly biodiverse grassland.315 With 
regards to non-natural highly biodiverse grasslands, an exception is possible if harvesting of raw 
material was necessary to preserve the area’s grassland status.316 Second, for other biodiversity 
dimensions that are not explicitly covered by the sustainability criteria, the Directive provides 
complementary monitoring requirements: Member States are to report on estimated impacts of 
biofuels production on biodiversity, water resources, water quality and soil quality within their 
territories,317 while the Commission is expected to report on possible broader impacts in Member 
States and third countries that are a significant source of raw material for biofuels consumed within 
the Union as to their ratification and implementation of other relevant international agreements, 
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such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the Convention on the International Trade in 
Endangered Species.318 
 
Another relevant criteria at the intersection of biodiversity and climate change concerns the 
prohibition to derive biofuels from raw material obtained from land with high carbon stock, namely 
land that had in January 2008 and no longer has the status of wetlands (as defined in the Convention 
on Wetlands of International Importance319), continuously forested areas or areas with 10-30% 
canopy cover.320 Using such land for biofuels production would result in a negative net greenhouse 
gas emission reduction impact given that carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere as a result 
of land conversion.321 The Commission has indicated that monitoring compliance with land-related 
criteria can take the form of aerial photographs, satellite images, maps, land register entries and site 
surveys.322 
 
While noting the importance of broader land use issues,323 the final compromise did not provide for 
the inclusion of other environmental or social concerns in the sustainability criteria. Instead, the EU 
tasks the Commission with biannual reports on the impact on social sustainability in the EU and in 
third countries of increased demand for biofuel, on the impact of the EU’ biofuel policy on the 
availability of foodstuffs at affordable prices, in particular for people living in developing countries, 
and wider development issues, including the respect of land-use rights and implementation of listed 
human rights and labour conventions.324 Thus, the matter is kept under review for the time being, 
with the possibility in the short-term (in 2012) for the Commission to propose ‘corrective action, in 
particular if evidence shows that biofuels production has a significant impact on food prices.’325 
Similarly, the Commission is to report in 2012 and propose corrective action as to whether it would 
be ‘feasible and appropriate to introduce mandatory requirements in relation to air, soil and water 
protection, taking into account the latest scientific evidence and the EU international obligations.’326 
This more cautious approach certainly reflects current impasses in multilateral negotiations, where 
discussions of social issues related to biofuels, such as land tenure and food prices, as well as 
impacts on indigenous and local communities, remain very controversial.327 
 
As to the level of ambition of the criteria, on the one hand it should be further noted that preference 
is given to second-generation biofuels, which are considered more promising in terms of reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions,328 in the Directive: the contribution made by biofuels produced from 
wastes, residues, non-food cellulosic material, and ligno-cellulosic material is considered to be 
twice that made by other biofuels in meeting the 10% target.329 On the other hand, however, the 
                                                
318 Ibid., Art. 17(7).  
319 Ibid., preambular para 73. 
320 Ibid., Art. 17(4). 
321 Ibid., preambular para 70.  
322 COM(2010)160/02, cited supra note 316, at 10. 
323 Preambular paras. 85 and 89 of Directive 2009/28/EC, cited supra note 29. The paragraphs refer to relevant 
questions of land degradation and desertification. 
324 Ibid., Art. 17(7). 
325 Ibid., Art. 17(7) last subpara. 
326 Ibid., Art. 18(9)(b). 
327 Disagreement on these issues has to some extent been overcome in the context of the CBD, since the last meeting of 
the Conference of the Parties in late 2010 addressed biofuels-related questions linked to food and energy security, as 
well as “the consideration of land tenure and resource rights, including water, where relevant for the CBD 
implementation, and in particular the implications for indigenous and local communities” (Decision X/37 Biofuels and 
biodiversity (2010), para. 2. 
328 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and International Energy Agency, “Biofuel Support 
Policies: An Economic Assessment” (OECD, Paris, 2008), at 49. 
329 Art. 21(2) of Directive 2009/28/EC, cited supra note 29. 
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sustainability criteria, at least for the time being, do not apply to solid biomass.330 The exclusion of 
solid biomass, thus, undermines the effectiveness of the sustainability criteria in achieving their 
stated objectives, because the use of solid biomass331 in the EU is several times higher than the use 
of biofuels,332 and biogas 333 covered by the criteria. 
 
Provisions on public participation may also be instrumental in ensuring internal environmental 
integration in the context of the EU’s biofuels sustainability criteria. The Renewables Directive 
requires that Member States inform the public on the availability and environmental benefits of all 
different renewable sources of energy for transport.334 In addition, the Commission is to create an 
online public transparency platform to facilitate and promote cooperation between Member States 
and make public relevant information that the Commission or a Member State deems to be of key 
importance to the Directive and to the achievement of its objectives,335 although there is no specific 
mention of the sustainability biofuels criteria. The Commission has also stressed that although the 
Directive does not require Member States to make information public, they are encouraged to 
publish biofuels sustainability information in a consistent manner for all fuels, taking into account 
possible commercially sensitive character of a company’s specific information.336  
 
Overall, the participation provisions do not seem sufficiently strong, and seem to confirm the 
impression that while the EU’s biofuels sustainability criteria take into account a variety of 
environmental concerns on the basis of international environmental processes, in an attempt to 
satisfy internal environmental integration, they have prioritized certain (but not all) broader 
environmental and social concerns. Nonetheless, the Package has left the door open for a more 
ambitious approach in the future, allowing for early review to reflect progress in multilateral 
negotiations. Two broader considerations also come into play in assessing the criteria’s effective 
contribution to environmental sustainability. First, it remains to be seen if the existing criteria will 
be able to influence biofuel production in third countries, given the reliance on economic operators 
and independent auditors for their enforcement, and the practical difficulties in overseeing their 
application on the part of the Commission, considering its limited resources for fulfilling its 
monitoring obligations.337 Second, corrective measures envisaged by the Directive in case of 
negative reports on sustainability in third countries will most likely entail a policy declaration, to 
avoid any WTO law incompatibility issues,338 which are discussed next. 
ii. WTO Law Compatibility 
During the preparatory process for the Renewables Directive, a number of developing countries 
raised concerns over the compatibility of the planned biofuels sustainability criteria with WTO law, 
highlighting they could violate Article 2 of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and 
impose “unjustifiably complex requirements on producers” and “impinge disproportionately on 
                                                
330 In February 2010 the Commission indicated that it did not intend to recommend binding sustainability criteria for 
solid biomass and biogas used in electricity, heating and cooling, but suggest voluntary criteria for Member States to 
include on national schemes, with the possibility to review this decision in 2011. “Commission adopts Biomass 
Sustainability Report” (Europa Rapid Press Release) IP/10/192, 25 Feb. 2010. 
331 “Solid biomass barometer, Eurobserv’ER, Nov 2010” 200 Systèmes Solaires le journal des énergies renouvelables 
(2010), at 123 
332 “Biofuels barometer – Eurobserv’ER – Jul 2010, ” 198 Systèmes Solaires le journal des énergies renouvelables 
(2010), at 73 
333 “Biogas barometer, Eurobserv’ER, Nov 2010, ” 200 Systèmes Solaires le journal des énergies renouvelables (2010), 
at 105. 
334 When the percentages of biofuels, blended in mineral oil derivatives, exceed 10% by volume, Member States shall 
require this to be indicated at the sales points. Art. 21(1) of Directive 2009/28/EC, cited supra note 29. 
335 Ibid., Art. 24. 
336 COM(2010)160/02, cited supra note 316, at 6. 
337 Scott, cited supra note 296, pp. 56-58. 
338 Vedder, cited supra note 17, at 9. 
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developing countries.”339 They also argued that the criteria could violate the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, including its Article XX because they distort international trade without suitable 
scientific justification or the support of international treaties.340 Indeed, given that the sustainability 
criteria also apply to imported biofuels, they can be expected to have practical implications on 
production in third countries wishing to export biofuels to the growing markets in the EU - which, 
as discussed above, was exactly the Directive’s intention. In principle, sustainability standards 
seeking to impact land use in foreign countries would seem to surface questions concerning WTO 
law and point towards the long-standing and controversial debate on the permissibility of trade 
measures triggered by the way in which a product is produced. 
 
When preparing the Renewables Directive, the Commission was aware of the potential international 
trade law implications of the sustainability criteria and it has been argued that the WTO aspect has 
been taken into consideration when drafting the Renewables Directive. According to Scott, “those 
familiar with the contours of WTO law will perceive in the text of the Renewables Directive efforts 
to align the scope and application of the sustainability criteria with the multiple requirements of 
WTO law.”341 In other words, the criteria: apply both to domestic and imported products; contain a 
range of qualifications and exceptions in a bid to ensure that they are no more trade-restrictive than 
necessary; make recourse to international standards where possible; and are cognisant of the 
importance of WTO- imposed due process demands.342  From the point of view of WTO law, it is 
also relevant to note that compliance with the sustainability criteria is not a precondition for placing 
biofuels on the EU market, although in practice it makes them uncompetitive as they cannot be 
counted against the 10% target. In other words, lack of compliance with these criteria does not lead 
to a ban on imports or use within the EU, but rather to a series of disincentives.343 Specifically non-
compliant biofuels are ineligible for: meeting the biofuels targets;344 compliance with renewable 
energy obligations;345 receiving biofuels consumption financial support;346 meeting the Fuel Quality 
Directive greenhouse gas emissions reductions targets;347  investment and/or operating aid in 
accordance with the Guidelines on state aid for environmental protection;348 and the provisions for 
alternative-fuel vehicles.349 
 
There is, however, still some uncertainty as to whether the sustainability criteria for biofuels would 
be considered fully compatible with WTO law. As indicated above, the question of trade measures 
related to the way in which a product is produced (rather than the product’s intrinsic qualities) has 
been highly controversial under the international trade regime for more than two decades.350 
Another long-standing and controversial debate relates to the permissibility of extraterritorial 
environmental trade measures – in case of the EU’s sustainability criteria for biofuels, they aim to 
                                                
339 The countries include Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Indonesia and Malaysia. 
See, “Open Letter to the Council, Parliament and the Commission of the European Communities” (6 Nov. 2008) 
<http:// www.r-e-a.net/document-library/thirdparty/081010DevlopingCountriesLettertoEU.pdf> accessed 11 Nov. 
2010. 
340 Ibid. 
341 Scott, cited supra note 296, at 58-59. 
342 Ibid.  
343 COM(2010)160/02, cited supra note 316, at 2-3. 
344 Art. 17(1)(a) of Directive 2009/28/EC, cited supra note 29. 
345 Ibid., Art. 17(1)(b). 
346 Ibid., Art. 17(1)(c). 
347 Art. 7 of Directive 2009/30/EC, cited supra note 31. 
348 Commission, “Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection”, cited supra note 112. 
349 For E85 ethanol only, Art. 6 of Regulation 443/2009, cited supra note 33. 
350 In the Shrimp-Turtle case it was found that such trade measures can be compatible with WTO law at least in certain 
circumstances. See, WTO Appellate Body report, “United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia” (22 Oct. 2001) WT/DS58/AB/RW. 
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protect biodiversity within the territory of the exporting state.351 Furthermore, as Scott has pointed 
out, WTO law has evolved in a direction that mirrors the internal market law of the EU and also 
under the WTO, non-discriminatory trade measures may have to be justified as necessary to achieve 
a legitimate objective under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.352 The necessity test 
provides the WTO dispute settlement bodies an opportunity to weigh and balance the trade-
restrictive measure, including the degree of trade restrictiveness and importance of the underlying 
goal.353 The increasing reliance on necessity means that the standard of review exercised by the 
WTO dispute settlement system has become more intrusive. For the EU’s biofuels sustainability 
criteria, the combined effect of all these considerations is that some uncertainty remains concerning 
their compatibility with WTO law.   
iii. Bilateral External Dimension 
Not only are the sustainability criteria systematically invoked by the EU in multilateral negotiations 
on biofuels,354 but they also have a bilateral international dimension. Motivated by the concern that 
biofuels production in third countries might not respect minimum environmental or social 
requirements and the aim to promote the production of biofuels and bioliquids worldwide in a 
sustainable manner,355 the Directive indicates that the EU will endeavour to conclude bilateral or 
multilateral agreements with third countries containing provisions on the sustainability criteria.356 
This is certainly related to the difficulty for Member States to check third country operators’ 
compliance357 with the sustainability criteria. The Commission thus indicated three methods to 
verify compliance: a national system – i.e. requesting operators to provide national authorities with 
data on compliance subject to independent auditing of the information submitted; 358 a voluntary 
scheme recognized by the Commission for that purpose; or a bilateral or multilateral agreement 
concluded by the EU, recognized by the Commission for this purpose. 359 While national systems 
will be based on the default values set by the Renewables Directive to show compliance with the 
greenhouse gas emission savings, the other two systems may also cover other sustainability issues 
that are not covered by the Directive.360 This bilateral external dimension could also be seen in the 
context of WTO law: in the Shrimp-Turtle case it was found that the US (unsuccessful) bilateral 
negotiations with countries targeted by its environmental trade restrictions were relevant for 
determining WTO law compatibility of the measure.361  
 
The Directive specifically requires due consideration for measures taken for the conservation of 
areas that provide in critical situations basic ecosystem services. It also states that the Commission 
may recognize areas for the protection of ecosystems or species protected by international 
agreements, so as to take into account land, labour and additional environmental concerns not 
covered by the sustainability criteria, or included in lists drawn up by intergovernmental 
organizations or The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) for the purposes of 
fulfilling the high biodiversity value land criteria.362 The Commission is further required to monitor 
                                                
351 Scott, cited supra note 296, at 60. 
352 Ibid., at 60-61. 
353 Ibid. 
354 UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/14/12, cited supra note 214, para 12.  
355 Preambular para 74 of Directive 2009/28/EC, cited supra note 29, emphasis added. 
356 Ibid., Art. 18(4).  
357 Ibid. Art. 17(8). Communication on the practical implementation of the EU biofuels sustainability scheme, cited 
supra note 254, at 6. On the question of harmonization, see Scott, cited supra note 296, pp. 55-56. 
358 Art. 18(3) of Directive 2009/28/EC, cited supra note 29. See also COM(2010)160/02, cited supra note 316, at 4 
359 Ibid., Arts. 18(4) and 18(7).  
360 Commission, “Communication from the Commission on voluntary schemes and default values in the EU biofuels 
and bioliquids sustainability scheme” COM(2010) 160/01, 19 Jun. 2010, [2010] OJ C160/1, at 4-5. 
361 United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
Malaysia, cited supra note 350. 
362 Ibid. 
(2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 829-891 
the origin of biofuels and the impacts of their production on land use in third countries of supply 
with a view to analyzing the impact of increased demand for biofuels on sustainability in these 
countries, considering economic and environmental impacts, including on biodiversity. In light of 
these and other ambitious monitoring tasks,363 the Directive calls upon the Commission to maintain 
a dialogue and exchange information with third countries and biofuels producers, consumer 
organizations and civil society concerning the general implementation of the Directive.364  
 
The Directive has already had visible impacts in the EU’s bilateral external relations: ongoing 
dialogues between the EU and Latin American countries, Brazil and the US have been used to 
discuss biofuels sustainability criteria.365 In addition, the Sustainability Impact Assessments, which 
are used to identify trade-offs between economic growth and environmental impacts of EU’s 
bilateral trade agreements, have addressed the issue of certification for biofuels among policy 
recommendation to ensure sustainability 366  or even more specifically made reference to the 
Renewables Directive and its criteria as guidance for third countries.367 The Commission has thus 
pointed to the opportunity to discuss the applicability of the EU biofuels sustainability criteria to 
processes carried out in third countries, as a means to prevent negative environmental and social 
impacts arising from the trade negotiations.368 
 
Overall, the international dimensions of the Package are tightly interlinked: on the one hand, the EU 
actively promotes a holistic approach to biofuels at the multilateral level, showcasing its 
sustainability criteria not only through its interventions in relevant multilateral fora; and on the 
other hand, it promotes their application in willing third countries, through its bilateral relations, 
possibly with a view to building larger consensus on the criteria from the bottom up.369 These 
combined efforts can be motivated both by internal environmental integration and by attempts to 
ensure compatibility with WTO law. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This analysis shows that the contribution of the EU’s Climate and Energy Package to the 
implementation of the environmental integration principle of is, at least on paper, significant. The 
EU has attempted to mainstream climate change considerations into a range of sectors (external 
environmental integration), which is necessary given the multitude of activities and actors that must 
                                                
363 Ibid., Art. 17(7), which, among other things, mandates the the Commission to monitor third countries’ ratification 
and implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the Convention on the International Trade in 
Endangered Species, 
364 Ibid., Art. 23(2). 
365 EUROLAT – Resolution of 15 May 2010, Seville (Spain), ‘Tackling climate change challenges together: for an EU-
LAC coordinated strategy in the framework of the UNFCCC negotiations’, 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/eurolat/assembly/plenary_sessions/seville_2010/adopted_docs/climat_change/
817703en.pdf>, paras. 37-38; Third European Union-Brazil Summit, Stockholm, 6 October 2009 – Joint Statement, 
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EU-MERCOSUR Association Agreement, July 2010, <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/146386.htm>, at P. 5; 
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be engaged to effectively combat climate change and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. The EU 
ETS plays an important role in this regard, as setting a price for greenhouse gas emissions is 
commonly viewed as one of the most important mitigation tools.370 The Package has contributed to 
this objective, first, by affirming that emissions trading will continue in the EU regardless of 
whether the UN climate change negotiations lead to agreement on the continuation of the Kyoto 
Protocol or its replacement by a new climate treaty in the post-2012 period. Second, the Package 
has also extended the carbon price signal by broadening the scope of the ETS both in terms of 
activities and greenhouse gases covered. Third, the Package has also increased long-term certainty 
concerning the scale of emission reductions required in the ETS sector by including in the Directive 
provisions on a linearly declining, EU-wide emissions cap. It has also improved transparency 
through new rules on the allocating of EUAs through auctioning and harmonised, EU-wide rules 
taking advantage of benchmarks. However, setting the price signal and emissions cap at the right 
level has proven difficult - without new measures for the third trading period, the effectiveness of 
the ETS in sending an adequate carbon price signal and promoting low-emissions investment is 
questionable. Binding emission reduction targets for Member States in sectors not covered by the 
ETS, through the Effort-sharing Decision, also contribute to external environmental integration 
(that is, climate mainstreaming in non-environmental sectors), as do measures to implement the 
20% energy efficiency target. In addition, the tighter links between the EU climate policy and 
energy policy certainly contribute to climate change mainstreaming in several sectors.  
 
Through the Package, the EU has also attempted to “increase positive and reduce negative impacts 
of climate change mitigation and adaptation measures on biodiversity”,371 consistent with the 
internal dimension of environmental integration (environmental sustainability of the EU’s responses 
to climate change). The most obvious examples of internal environmental integration in the 
Package are the legal tools chosen to ensure the environmental sustainability of CCS projects and 
the sustainability criteria for biofuels. The CCS Directive is remarkable in that it is the first piece of 
legislation in the world aiming to create a legal framework for environmentally safe CCS projects. 
The Directive promotes internal integration through a set of CCS-specific environmental cautions, 
as well as links to other EU environmental legislation, such as the IPPC and EIA Directives, to 
ensure that broader environmental considerations are taken into account when using CCS to 
mitigate climate change. Concerning biofuels, as discussed above, the 10% renewable energy target 
in the transport sector was one of the most controversial element of the Package with strong 
concerns voiced concerning its environmental and social implications. This led to the inclusion in 
the Package of detailed sustainability criteria for both EU-produced and imported biofuels. The 
sustainability criteria provide a clear example of internal environmental integration as they attempt 
to ensure that the production of biofuels in the EU or in foreign countries does not lead to 
biodiversity loss,372 while also achieving a minimum level of greenhouse gas emission savings,373 
although environmental and social safeguards could have been much more ambitious.  
 
The analysis of the Package through the lens of the environmental integration principle has thus 
helped to explain the EU’s efforts to play a global leadership role in the fight against climate change 
through its attempts to use the Package to influence multilateral negotiations, such as those under 
                                                
370 According to the IPCC, “An effective carbon price signal could realize significant mitigation potential in all sectors.” 
See, “Summary for Policymakers” in Metz et al (Eds.), cited supra note 89, p. 19. According to the Stern Review, “The 
first essential element of climate change policy is carbon pricing. Greenhouse gases are, in economic terms, an 
externality: those who produce greenhouse gas do not face the full consequences of the cost of their actions 
themselves.” Stern, cited supra note 116, p. 349. 
371 This is an expression recently adopted by the CBD Conference of the Parties (Decision X/33, para 8(u), 2010). 
372 However, the outcome concerning indirect land-use change has been considered as weak. Phillips, “European 
Parliament capitulates on biofuels deal” EuObserver (5 Dec. 2008) <http://euobserver.com/9/27236> accessed 21 Feb. 
2011. 
373 For criticism of this approach, see conclusions by Vedder, cited supra note 17. 
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the CBD and Kyoto Protocol, in order to ensure that the international regimes reflect environmental 
integration. In addition, the EU clearly expects the Package to act as model for other countries on an 
individual basis, and plans to support this systematically through its bilateral external relations tools 
with partner third countries. Second, the Package provides interesting insights into the complex 
links between EU internal regulation and the EU’s external relations Outwardly, under the 
UNFCCC negotiations, the EU has frequently highlighted elements of the Package and encouraged 
other parties to adopt similar measures. Inwardly, the interdependence of the international and EU 
regulatory dimensions is also reflected in the way EU legislation is drafted with direct references to 
international instruments and notable review clauses in the Package linked to developments in 
ongoing international negotiations.374  
 
The internationalizing approach to European law-making has also surfaced questions concerning 
the compatibility of parts of the Package with WTO law. This concerns especially provisions 
related to carbon leakage and the possible inclusion of energy-intensive imports under the EU ETS 
and the biofuels sustainability criteria in the Renewables Directive. The idea of requiring 
developing country importers to purchase credits under the ETS has also raised concerns over its 
compatibility with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities under the UNFCCC. 
As discussed above, both concerns have been recognised by the Commission. It has been argued 
that EU’s efforts to influence global developments through its internal environmental legislation 
can be seen as a strategy to shield EU law from WTO challenges by putting pressure on other 
jurisdictions to adopt similar environmental legislation and/or adopt corresponding international 
standards, thus protecting the competitive interests of European companies that have to comply 
with high-standard environmental regulation.375 However, another explanation is that for the EU to 
fulfil its environmental integration principle and its objective of pursuing global solutions to climate 
change, the main driver of the globalization of EU law is that of promoting holistic environmental 
multilateralism with the secondary effect of “running the risk” of WTO law incompatibility.376 The 
present analysis of the key elements of the Package (particularly concerning carbon leakage and 
sustainability criteria for biofuels) reveals how the EU carefully calculates such risk and attempts to 
avoid solutions that would be clearly incompatible with the WTO Agreements. 
 
This article has also highlighted some of the complex and increasingly pronounced interactions 
between the EU’s position under multilateral fora and its domestic legislation with the its bilateral 
external relations. In other words, bilateral relations are used by the EU to support the 
implementation of multilateral environmental obligations in third countries (particularly developing 
ones), as well as to create or strengthen alliances with third countries with a view to influencing 
ongoing multilateral negotiations.377 This builds on the environmental cooperation clauses that can 
be found in the various Association, Cooperation and Partnerships Agreements concluded by the 
EU with third countries,378 which are usually coupled with significant development cooperation and 
                                                
374 See, for example, Arts. 10b and 11a. of Directive 2009/29/EC, cited supra note 30, and Arts. 5.2, 5.3, 8 and 9 of 
Decision 406/2009/EC, cited supra note 34. 
375 Kelemen, cited supra note 15. 
376 Morgera, “Relevance Beyond Borders…,” cited supra note 69, at 236. 
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Cooperation Agreement with Kazakhstan (28 Jul. 1999); and Art. 103, Stabilisation and Association Agreement with 
Croatia (28 Jan. 2005). Otherwise, more general cooperation clauses on global environmental issues or on the 
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policy dialogue.379 As pointed out in the previous sections, this bilateral external dimension is 
increasingly reflected in the way EU internal regulation is framed and implemented, as 
demonstrated by references to bilateral agreements and initiatives with third countries in the 
Package, in relation to climate funding and the expansion of the global carbon market under the EU 
ETS Directive, capacity building and collaborative research under the CCS Directive, joint projects 
under the Renewables Directive, and cooperation and monitoring on the biofuels sustainability 
criteria. 
 
The overall conclusion is that the Package represents an innovative and comprehensive approach, 
aiming to integrate climate change considerations into various economic sectors and activities 
within the EU, while at the same time ensuring that climate change mitigation is compatible with 
other environmental objectives. Such an integrative approach is important given the scale of the 
economic and social transformation needed in the coming decades to avoid dangerous 
anthropogenic climate change. At the same time, it is clear that the targets underlying the Package 
are not ambitious enough to effectively combat climate change (more ambitious measures will be 
needed between now and 2050 for the EU to achieve its objective of cutting greenhouse gas 
emissions by 80-95% by 2050), to secure the environmental sustainability of climate change 
measures, or to achieve a radical transformation of the EU’s economy. As explained above, the 
possibility of the EU increasing its emission reduction target from 20% to 30% from 1990 levels by 
2020 is currently being debated. From the view point of EU internal regulation, a decision to 
implement the 30% target would require further policies and measures, as the Package in its present 
form is only designed to achieve the EU’s unilateral 20% target. In this regard, the Commission is 
currently working on climate targets beyond 2050 and aims to publish a roadmap for a low-carbon 
economy in the spring of 2011.380 Equally, the legal tools deployed by the EU to prevent or 
minimize possible negative environmental impacts of climate change mitigation measures, such as 
the phased approach to the sustainability criteria for biofuels production, represent an initial step, 
that may well anticipate action by other countries, but that nonetheless remain limited. To this 
effect, the Package constitutes a starting point but deeper integration of climate change 
considerations into various economic sectors, coupled with stronger guarantees for the 
environmental sustainability of climate change measures, will be required. These challenges may 
thus imply that increased efforts will likely be exerted in the further refinement of EU climate law, 
in order to keep up the EU’s role as a global leader, avoid WTO law-related challenges and 
creatively use the EU’s external relations at the multilateral and bilateral level. EU environmental 
and general lawyers alike may wish to keep abreast of these legal experiments to better understand 
the evolving links between EU internal regulation and external action. 
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